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Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling
Democracy:
Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their
Effects on State and Local Governance
Ellen Dannin*
ABSTRACT
Key arguments for privatizing public infrastructure range from providing money
so cash-strapped governments can fix crumbling infrastructure and build much needed
new infrastructure to shifting future financial risk from the public to a private contractor.
The reality, though, is far different. Provisions commonly found in infrastructure
privatization contracts make the public the guarantor of private contractors’ expected
revenues. Indeed, were it not for provisions that protect contractors from diminution of
their expected returns, the contracts would be far shorter and much less complex. An
effect of those contract provisions is to give private contractors a quasi-governmental
status with power over new laws, judicial decisions, propositions voted on by the public,
and other government actions that a contractor claims will affect toll roads and revenues.
Giving private contractors such a role may well violate the non-delegation doctrine that
bars private entities from exercising power that is inherently governmental.
This Article examines the operation and effects of three provisions that are
commonly found in infrastructure contracts: (1) compensation events; (2) noncompetition
provisions; and (3) the contractor’s right to object to and receive compensation for
legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions. The operation of these provisions
gives private contractors power over decisions that affect the public interest and are
normally made by public officials and subject to oversight, disclosure, and
accountability—none of which apply to private contractors. The existence and operation
of these provisions have gone virtually unexamined and undiscussed. Rather, discussions
about infrastructure privatization have been narrowly focused on tolls, reflexive pro- or
anti- private or public provisions, and spending or investment decisions on up-front
payments.
Finally, this Article places infrastructure privatization in the larger context of
funding and building infrastructure for the future. It identifies and critiques substantive
and procedural issues that must be resolved if we are to have the high quality
infrastructure necessary to meet this nation’s needs and further its goals and if we are to
achieve those goals by an open and democratic process.
*
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION
¶1

¶2

¶3

On July 24, 2008, the Denver Post reported that Coloradans were shocked to learn
that the private contractors that had leased the Northwest Parkway had objected to
improvements on West 160th Avenue and that the contractors had the legal right to
object.1 The contractors opposed improvements “because they might hurt the parkway
financially.”2 Colorado State Representative Frank McNulty declared: “The purpose of
toll roads is to augment state transportation infrastructure, not act as a roadblock to the
construction of new transportation infrastructure in the northwest metro area.”3
McNulty was wrong, and his comments came a year too late. Had he read the
Northwest Parkway privatization contract4 he would have learned that under its “adverse
action” provisions, the contractors had the right to object to new or improved roads and
mass transit systems. In addition, the contractors had the right to receive compensation
for lost anticipated revenues if those roads or transit systems were built during the term of
the ninety-nine year contract.5 Most people would be surprised to learn that contracts to
privatize major infrastructure, such as the Northwest Parkway, Chicago parking meters,
proposed Indianapolis parking meters, and proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contracts
give private contractors these rights.6
Moreover, this was the case even though neither McNulty nor any member of the
public could have raised objections to the contract before it was consummated, for the
terms were not released until after the deal was signed.7 Agreeing to multi-decade
1

Jeffrey Leib, Toll Firm Objects to Work on W. 160th: The “Non-Compete” Clause for the Northwest
Parkway Raises Legislative Concerns, DENVER POST, July 24, 2008, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_9976830.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
The contract was between the Northwest Parkway Public Highway Authority, made up of local counties
and cities (the City and County of Broomfield, City of Lafayette, and Weld County), and Brisas/CCR.
Brisa/CCR Selected as Preferred Concessionaire for NW Parkway Co, TOLL ROADS NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007,
http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/64; Greg Avery, Company Set to Pay up for Parkway, BROOMFIELD
ENTERPRISE, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.broomfieldenterprise.com/ci_12778502?IADID=Searchwww.broomfieldenterprise.com-www.broomfieldenterprise.com.
5
See Northwest Parkway Concession and Lease Agreement, Art. 14–Art. 15.1, Aug. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.northwestparkway.org/PDF/FinalCLA.pdf.
6
Examples of the contract provisions are discussed throughout this Article. Excerpts from several are also
included in an Appendix to this Article.
See Indy’s “Son of Chicago” Parking Meter Lease to Be a Disaster for City, URBANOPHILE, Sept.
7,
2010,
http://www.urbanophile.com/2010/09/07/indys-son-of-chicago-parking-meter-lease-to-be-adisaster-for-city/, for a comparison of the Chicago and Indianapolis parking meter contract terms. See also
CHICAGO METERED PARKING SYSTEM CONCESSION AGREEMENT (Dec. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
[hereinafter CHICAGO PARKING METER CONTRACT]; INDIANA TOLL ROAD CONCESSION AND LEASE
AGREEMENT, BETWEEN IND. FIN. AUTH. AND ITR CONCESSION CO., available at
http://www.in.gov/ifa/2328.htm (follow “Concession Agreement” hyperlink); Memorandum from Senator
Mark Norris, Tennessee, Chair, Economic Development, Transportation & Cultural Affairs Committee,
Report of Activities of the Economic Development, Transportation & Cultural Affairs Committee, to
Members of the Executive Committee (July 16, 2007), available at http://www.slcatlanta.org/chairreports/2007_Chair_Reports/EDTCA_07_Rept.shtml (discussing infrastructure privatization contract terms
concerning compensation if competing roads are built).
7
The author was following this issue at the time and was notified as soon as the signed contract was
released. This was the first time the public had seen the terms. The contract received immediate strong
criticisms by Coloradans, including the Colorado blogosphere. The next day, the posted contract and the
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infrastructure privatization contracts, despite providing no opportunity for public scrutiny
of the contract terms or right to object, is not unique to the Northwest Parkway lease. For
example, in 2008, Mayor Richard Daley insisted that the Chicago City Council approve
the seventy-five year lease of the city’s parking meters within two days after council
members first saw the terms of the complex 279 page document.8
However, even when contract terms are made public, few people read or
understand their effects. Reporter Steve Katula explained:
Virginia’s contract for the Beltway HOT lanes are not just far from
free to taxpayers and even worse if people carpool. The structure of the
deal ultimately minimizes public outrage until it’s too late, saddling
taxpayers with a high bill and no voice.
....
Most Northern Virginians were completely unaware of the VDOT
“Megaproject” prior to construction, and this illustrates the problematic
nature of complex contracts that promise free stuff.
When taxpayer dollars are (supposedly) not involved, citizens (and
even politicians) retract from the process, especially from boring
contractual details . . . . [T]he supposedly free and complex, “black-box”
nature of the HOT lanes deal served to discourage input and criticism.
Despite VDOT following legally-mandated procedures for public input,
the result was an opaque deal-making process, and a bad deal for
Virginians.
....
But with the cards now on the table, one must ask what was wrong
with the original estimates? Why the promise they could do the project on
a totally private basis, followed by the late-in-the-game change? Why did
politicians, VDOT, The Washington Post, and the public believe the
almost magic promises, and why was there so little reaction when the
nature of the project funding changed, but the reward mechanism to the
private contractor did not?9

summary of its provisions were altered so that they were viewable but could no longer be cut and pasted.
The urls were also altered so that they ended with “.pdf.pdf.” See shirah, Failure is Not an Option . . . If
You Lease a Colorado Tollroad (Sept. 6, 2007, 1:55 PM) UNBOSSED.COM,
http://www.unbossed.com/index.php?itemid=1708; see also em dash, Toll Road Sale Drives Hummer of a
Question: Why? (Sept. 6, 2007, 12:16 PM) UNBOSSED.COM,
http://www.unbossed.com/index.php?itemid=1707; shirah, Highway Privatization, Taxes, and Picking the
Public Pocket - Part II (Mar. 2, 2008, 10:25 AM) UNBOSSED.COM,
http://www.unbossed.com/index.php?itemid=1985.
8
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. CITY OF CHI., REPORT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEASE OF THE CITY’S PARKING METERS 1, 6 (2009) [hereinafter
CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT], available at
http://www.chicagoreader.com/features/blogs/pdf/IGO-CMPS-20090602.pdf; Darrell Preston, A Windfall
for Investors, a Loss for Chicago: Critics Says the Windy City Will Lose Billions over the Life of a $1.15
Billion Contract to Run the City’s Parking Meters, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 12, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_34/b4192044579970.htm.
9
Steve Kattula, Corporate Welfare and the Beltway HOT Lanes, Part 3: Don’t Worry Until It’s Too Late,
GREATER GREATER WASH., Nov. 18, 2009, http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post.cgi?id=4102.
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In short, most people receive no information about important terms of these deals,
either before or after they are consummated, ignore the subject as too complex for them
to understand, or accept that cash-strapped governments have no alternatives to
privatization if they are to fix their crumbling infrastructure.
The August 1, 2007 collapse of the I-35 bridge in Minneapolis10 was a wake-up
call about the danger of deferred maintenance which all states face today.11 It is all but
impossible to overstate the poor condition of our public infrastructure. When he
introduced the yet to be enacted Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009,
Congressman James Oberstar, then Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, presented the bleak facts:
Currently, many segments of the nation’s surface transportation
infrastructure are reaching or have exceeded their useful design life.
Today, almost 61,000 miles (37 percent) of all lane miles on the NHS
[National Highway System] are in poor or fair condition; more than
152,000 bridges—one of every four bridges in the United States—are
structurally deficient or functionally obsolete; and more than 32,500
public transit buses and vans have exceeded their useful life. The nation’s
largest public transit agencies face an $80 billion maintenance backlog to
bring their rail systems to a state of good repair and, within the next six
years, almost every transit vehicle (55,000 vehicles) in rural America will
need to be replaced. The American Society of Civil Engineers grades our
surface transportation system as follows:
Roads DBridges C
Transit D
Rail C12

¶7

Deficient infrastructure is dangerous and expensive in terms of lives and injuries,
impediments to commerce, inefficient and unnecessarily costly transportation, and
degradation of the environment.13
No one doubts that we face an enormous task with respect to improving our
infrastructure. For example, Pennsylvania has 128 bridges in its interstate system alone
that are structurally deficient, fracture-critical, or functionally obsolete.14 It also has no
money to pay for repairs to its infrastructure system, to say nothing of paying for repairs

10

Demian McLean & Angela Greiling Keane, Minnesota Bridge Fall Kills 4; Divers Seek Victims,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aG7N.nUqmdOQ#.
11
Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 351, 356–57 (2009) (discussing the dire state of U.S. infrastructure).
12
HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZATION ACT
OF 2008: A BLUEPRINT FOR INVESTMENT AND REFORM 2 (2009) [hereinafter STAA BLUEPRINT] (on file
with author).
13
Id. at 1–2.
14
PA. TPK. COMM’N, PA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON THE NEEDS AND FUNDING
STATUS OF INTERSTATE 80 IN PENNSYLVANIA 7 (2009).
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to all of its other deficient public infrastructure. Pennsylvania is not alone.15 Putting our
national transportation infrastructure in good repair would require spending $2.2 trillion
over the next five years.16 Unfortunately, that level of funding is simply not available.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO):
The problem is simple: revenues from motor fuels taxes and truck-related
taxes to support the HTF [Highway Trust Fund]—the primary source of
funds for highway and transit—are not keeping pace with authorized
spending levels. This problem was made dramatically apparent last
summer when the Highway Account within the trust fund was nearly
depleted. Despite an $8 billion infusion from the General Fund of the
Treasury in September 2008 to replenish the account, we find ourselves in
the same predicament a year later.17

¶8

Using other funds from the federal budget to subsidize the Highway Trust Fund does not
solve the problem of inadequate funds. Rather, it merely postpones our finance and
infrastructure problems.18
It is easy to see why infrastructure privatization is the solution many states are
turning to in order to repair, build, modernize, and operate highways and other
infrastructure.19 States and cities are also using the up-front payments that are part of
many infrastructure privatization deals to address their budget deficits.20 In addition to
providing funds, privatization is popularly seen as a way to shift future financial risk to
the private contractor.21

15

Michigan is but one of many other states whose situation is also dire. See MICH. TRANSP. FUNDING
TASK FORCE, TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS: A REPORT ON MICHIGAN’S TRANSPORTATION NEEDS AND
FUNDING ALTERNATIVES vi–xi (2008), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdot/MDOT_TF2_Entire_Report_255609_7.pdf.
16
STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 12.
17
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-845T, HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING
SUSTAINABILITY AND MECHANISMS TO MANAGE SOLVENCY 1 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09845t.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT HIGHWAY TRUST FUND, GAO-09845T]. See generally FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,FINANCING FEDERAL-AID
HIGHWAYS,
THE
HIGHWAY
TRUST
FUND,
FHWA-PL-99-015
(1999),
available
at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/fifahiwy/fifahi05.htm. (providing an historical overview of funding for
federal aid highways).
18
See infra Part IV, for a more detailed discussion of the issue of taxes to fund infrastructure repair and
construction.
19
See Jewel Edwards, Public-Private Partnerships: Georgia, California, Arizona Prepare to Take On
More Public-Private Partnership Projects, BNA INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT & POLICY REPORT, Sept.
28, 2009.
20
See Daniel Schulman, Highway Privatization: A Dead End? MOTHER JONES, May 22, 2009,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2009/05/highway-privatization-dead-end (arguing that the Indiana toll
road was purchased by a private entity for a price far below its value).
21
SEAN SLONE, TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: A CSG NATIONAL REPORT 24 (N.D.),
available
at
http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/TransportationInfrastructureFinance.pdf;
SPOCK
SOLUTIONS INC. & JACOBS, KAN. TPK. AUTH, KAN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., USING TOLLS TO SUPPORT NEEDED
TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS: A RESOURCE FOR KANSAS POLICYMAKERS 3-32–3-33 (2008) [hereinafter
KANSAS POLICYMAKER REPORT], available at
http://www.kansastlink.com/downloads/VI%20Using%20Tolls%20to%20Support%20Needed%20Transpo
rtation%20Projects.pdf (“By moving to private participation in toll roads, the public benefits from private
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However, not everyone is sanguine about infrastructure privatization as a solution
to these problems. While the public wants good transportation, people do not necessarily
embrace infrastructure privatization.
Look no further than Indiana, where Governor Daniels’s popularity ratings
plunged in the wake of the sale of the toll road amid a hue and cry about
foreign firms’ owning our roads. And as the self-styled populist Lou
Dobbs asked, “What right do they have to sell something that belongs to
the taxpayer?”22

¶10

¶11

Macquarie, one of the international firms engaged in infrastructure privatization, has even
been accused of running “an old-fashioned Ponzi scheme,” rather than inventing a new
way to finance infrastructure.23
An August 2010 Bloomberg Businessweek report on the Chicago parking meter
deal captures the many ways in which government and investors are affected by these
deals.24 According to Bloomberg, it is estimated that Chicago drivers will pay the private
parking meter contractor more than $11.6 billion in parking fees over the next 75 years.25
That is more than ten times the $1.15 billion the City of Chicago received for the
concession in 2008.26 The Morgan Stanley led partnership’s 2010 documents to support
the sale of $500 million of notes say that they expect to earn a profit of $9.58 billion
before interest, taxes, and depreciation.27 That investment group is currently using
aggressive parking-fee hikes to make a return of more than 80 cents per dollar of
projected revenue, twenty times the 4.84 cents on a dollar earned by the concession
owner at O’Hare and Midway airports in 2009.28
In 2007, Congressman Oberstar, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, and Congressman Peter DeFazio, Chair of the Subcommittee on
Highways and Transit, wrote governors, state legislators, and state transportation officials
that privatizing the nation’s transportation infrastructure was not in the public’s interest.29
In 2008, Oberstar and DeFazio wrote then Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters, a

assumption of risk as well as from the availability of private capital, and it is appropriate that investors be
paid to produce those public benefits.”).
22
Bethany McLean, Would You Buy a Bridge from this Man?, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/17/news/international/macquarie_infrastructure_funds.fortune/index.htm;
see Daniel Schulman & James Ridgeway, The Highwaymen: Why You Could Soon Be Paying Wall Street
Investors, Australian Bankers, and Spanish Builders for the Privilege of Driving on American Roads,
MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2007, http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2007/01/highwaymen.html;
Tim Gray, Is It Time to Add a Parking Lot to Your Portfolio?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/business/yourmoney/31infra.html.
23
McLean, supra note 22.
24
Preston, supra note 8.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Letter from Representative James L. Oberstar, Chairman of the House Transp. & Infrastructure Comm.
& Representative Peter A. DeFazio, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, to Governors,
State Legislators, and State Transportation Officials (May 10, 2007) (on file with author).
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proponent of privatization, that specific aspects of infrastructure privatization, including
noncompete agreements, undermined the nation’s transportation system.30
On June 22, 2009, Oberstar introduced the draft Surface Transportation
Authorization Act of 2009, a bill intended to
transform Federal surface transportation to a performance-based
framework to reduce fatalities and injuries on our Nation’s highways,
address the mobility and access needs of people and goods, improve the
condition, performance, and connectivity of the United States intermodal
surface transportation system, provide transportation choices for
commuters and travelers, promote environmental sustainability, public
health, and the livability of communities, support robust investment in
surface transportation, and for other purposes.31

¶13

¶14

Among its innovations, the Bill responded to concerns over questionable
infrastructure privatization by proposing the creation of an “Office of Public Benefit”
(OPB) within the Federal Highway Administration. The OPB was to (1) be a one-stop
shop for federal toll authority; (2) keep Interstates toll-free except under narrowly defined
circumstances; (3) require transportation alternatives and public protections where a
Federal-aid Highway is tolled; and (4) require public protections within highway
privatization contracts. 32 The OPB was to be charged with providing “for the protection
of the public interest in relation to highway toll projects and public-private partnership
agreements on Federal-aid highways.”33 Congressman James L. Oberstar, had played an
important role in infrastructure policy; however, after introducing the bill, Representative
Oberstar concluded that it would not be possible to get Congress to pass the Surface
Transportation Authorization Act of 2009 during that term. Oberstar lost his seat in the
2010 election,34 while the Democratic Party lost its majority in the House, so it seems
unlikely anyone will now champion the bill.
Our country faces many challenges but with far fewer resources than at any other
time in decades. Solutions are proposed, but not all are appropriate. If there is to be an
informed choice, there must be an informed public. The public deserves and needs to
understand how these multi-billion dollar contracts affect vital national infrastructure and
how they affect the public interest. This Article’s contribution to that conversation is to
first discuss key infrastructure privatization contract provisions and their operation. It

30

Letter from Representative James L. Oberstar, Chairman of the House Transp. & Infrastructure Comm.
& Representative Peter A. DeFazio, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, to Secretary
Mary Peters, Secretary, Dep’t. of Transp. (Nov. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
31
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1204 (Comm. Print 2009).
32
STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 31–33.; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. &
INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1204
(Comm. Print 2009).
33
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1204.
34
Oberstar Suggests 1-Year Extension, Reflects on 18 Terms in House, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22,
2010.
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then assesses innovations in the proposed Surface Transportation Authorization Act of
2009 and proposes ways to provide high quality transportation infrastructure.35
II. READING INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION CONTRACTS
¶15

It is no surprise that infrastructure privatization contracts are not widely read.
They are specialized, complex legal documents that tend to run over 100 pages, not
including attached documents that are referred to in the contract.36 In general, the terms
that have received the most public attention have been the amount of up-front money paid
by the private contractor and the contractor’s rights to impose or raise tolls or other user
fees.37 Missing from public discussion and scrutiny have been the contract terms that
make government parties to infrastructure privatization contracts the insurer of the
private contractor’s financial success. The three most commonly found provisions that
can require governments to reimburse private contractors for lost anticipated revenue are
(1) compensation events; (2) noncompetition provisions; and (3) “adverse action” or
“stabilization” clauses. Failing to have a national conversation about these terms and
their effects has left the public ignorant as to how these contract terms shift power over
government policy and actions to private contractors. The effects of these overlooked
terms will be felt long after the contracts end. These provisions are commonly found
across different types of infrastructure contracts, and their order and a large percentage of
their wording tends to be the same. For example, just the table of contents for the
Northwest Parkway and the Pennsylvania Turnpike contracts are at least 70% identical
and Article 14 in the contracts for the Colorado Northwest Parkway, Pennsylvania
Turnpike, and Chicago Parking Meters all concern “adverse actions.” Given the
prevalence of these terms in existing contracts, it seems likely that they will be found in
many privatization contracts and, as a result, state, county, and city power to govern will
be shifted to private contractors.
A. Compensation Events

¶16

A private contractor is only interested in a deal if it concludes that the investment
is likely to make more money compared to other available investments. It is curious,
then, that the private sector has become interested in infrastructure privatization in the
United States. A 1996 study of fourteen urban toll roads by J. P. Morgan Securities
found that only two of the projects had revenues that exceeded projections during the first
four years of operation, and ten projects’ “revenues fell short by 20 percent to 75
35

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
The proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract with all attachments is 686 pages. See [Proposed]
Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract (2008) (on file with author). The terms public-private partnerships, PPPs,
P3s, and infrastructure privatization are often used interchangeably.
37
See AM. FED’N OF STATE, CNTY. & MUN. EMP., TRANSPORTATION ASSETS: CASH COWS? (2008),
available at http://www.afscme.org/docs/08LegAgenda-transportation.pdf (calling into question the
wisdom of privatizing the operations of public roads); NAT’L ASS’N OF TRUCKSTOP OPERATORS,
INTERSTATE TOLLS AND HIGHWAY PRIVATIZATION (2009),
http://www.natso.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Top_NATSO_Issues&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&ContentID=8128&FusePreview=True&WebsiteKey=e91dcade-9ead-43ab-b6bc-c608fd2a3c34
(noting several reasons why tolls do not create positive outcomes for interstate travelers, businesses along
tolls roads, and interstate businesses .
36
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percent.”38 The Congressional Budget Office concluded that the “study may prompt
potential lenders and equity investors to take greater care in scrutinizing projections of
traffic and revenues and to require government funding or financial guarantees to reduce
the risk of investing, especially at the earliest and riskiest stages of the project.”39
Despite these findings and recommendations, problems with faulty traffic and revenue
predictions have continued.40
Given those results, it is surprising that private contractors continue to be
interested in infrastructure privatization. Toll road revenues can not be guaranteed as
long as revenue projections must be based on uncertain predictions as to the many factors
that can affect driving.41 Yet, despite the uncertainty, private contractors continue to be
interested in multi-decade deals when contracts with shorter terms would lessen the
problems of forecasting revenues. However, shorter contracts could mean losing the
benefit of federal tax provisions that allow contractors to take advantage of the ability to
take highly accelerated depreciation of the infrastructure. Those provisions are only
available if the contract term is so long it exceeds the useful life of the infrastructure and
effectively makes the private contractor the owner. In other words, infrastructure
privatization contractors have opted for a mix of ways to generate revenue other than
charging tolls or fees. Their revenues include government funding through the tax
system and revenue guarantees under the contract.42
For example, in 2008, the State of Indiana reimbursed the private Indiana Toll
Road operator $447,000 for waiving tolls of people evacuated during severe flooding.43
Had the road not been privatized, the state would have waived the tolls and simply
collected less revenue. The contract, however, put the contractor in a much better
financial situation than the state, because it did not lose toll revenues. In effect, these
reimbursement terms make government the contractor’s insurer and guarantor. The terms
may even create financial disincentives to government’s taking life-saving action. That
is, a state or local government that is so short of money that it must “sell” valuable public
infrastructure has more to consider in a disaster than just saving lives. If it needs to ask
how much protection it can afford, it may, on the margins, be tempted to decide against
taking actions that will require reimbursing the contractor.
Indeed, the contractual guarantees can put infrastructure contractors in a better
revenue position than its government partner had it continued to control the
infrastructure. For example, in November 2010, Chicago store owners along Touhy
38

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TOLL ROADS: A REVIEW OF RECENT EXPERIENCE 18 (1997), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4014/1997doc03-Entire.pdf.
39
Id.
40
See infra text accompanying notes 156–159.
41
Among the factors likely to affect driving and revenues, I would include interest rates; the attractiveness
of alternative investments; local, national, and world economies; and new modes of transportation. Traffic
can decline due to gas shocks; higher unemployment; shifts to mass transit; changing housing patterns; and
the economy in general.
42
See discussion infra notes 83–85.
43
PHINEAS BAXANDALL, KARI WOHLSCHLEGEL & TONY DUTZIK, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, PRIVATE
ROADS, PUBLIC COSTS: THE FACTS ABOUT TOLL ROAD PRIVATIZATION AND HOW TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC
19 (2009), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/rX/yT/rXyTdCxiacJTXJi3Cm-W1w/Private-Roads-Public-CostsUpdated.pdf; see Yvette Shields & Caitlin Devitt, Midwest Bond-Watch, BOND BUYER, Sept. 30, 2009;
State to Pay for Waiver Fees on Toll Road, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2008.
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Avenue found parking meters being installed where none had ever been. Their ward’s
alderman explained that the parking meter privatization contract required that there be
“no net loss in parking spots for Chicago Parking Meters LLC. ‘They’re guaranteed X
number of spots so if you remove them from one place, you have to replace them in
another.’”44 The city, of course, had no such meter or revenue replacement guarantee.
Much of infrastructure privatization contracts concerns contractor revenue guarantees.
From the point of view of the government partner, they operate as a form of penalty for
government’s taking actions in the public interest.
While money certainly matters, it is equally important to consider the effects these
terms are likely to have. First, although the documents take the form of contracts, they
are not simple bilateral contracts for a one-shot deal. Both types of agreements are an
exchange of money for providing a product or service at a specific time. However,
infrastructure privatization contracts concern more than the delivery of a physical
product; they control the operation of and care for vital and expensive infrastructure for
many decades.45 That infrastructure was paid for with public money and is part of a link
in a larger system intended to promote the well being of the public, not to be a direct
source of private profits.
Second, under these contracts, the damage calculations are anything but simple.
Rather, they are based on multi-decade revenue predictions, whose accuracy cannot be
verified. Both problems are the result of opting to lock in terms governing the
relationships for the life of a long-term contract, rather than using a flexible method for
dealing with uncertain events into the distant future. The value of the contract thus
depends on accurately predicting and accounting for income, expenses, goals, quality of
commitment to the relationship, others’ needs and temptations, the economy, acts of
nature, and how to deal with problems that arise in any of these areas. From the
contractor’s point of view, it also depends on assurance that the government party will
pay, and will do so with as little cost of getting that payment as possible.
A good example of the challenges just described can be found in Section 3.7(a)(1)
on “Rights of the [Pennsylvania] Commonwealth to Access and Perform Work on the
Turnpike” in the proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contract. The Commonwealth retains
rights “to inspect the Turnpike or determine whether or not the Concessionaire is in
compliance with its obligations under this Agreement or applicable Law pursuant to
Section 8.3.”46 Another provision allows the Commonwealth to enter the Turnpike if the
private contractor has defaulted, so that the Commonwealth can “make any necessary
repairs to the Turnpike, perform any work therein and take any reasonable actions in
connection therewith, including remediation of Hazardous Substances, pursuant to
Section 16.1 (b)(iii).”47 In other words, as the lessor, Pennsylvania needed to retain rights
to enter the highway after it was privatized in order to ensure that the private contractor
has kept its side of the bargain.
44

Parking Pay Box Pops Up To Dismay Of Businesses, CBS CHICAGO, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2010/11/09/parking-pay-box-pops-up-to-dismay-of-businesses/.
45
See infra text accompanying notes 77–80.
46
[Proposed] Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract § 3.7(a) (i) 42 (2008) (on file with author). Although the
title says “Final” the contract was proposed but not approved by the Pennsylvania legislature. As a result, it
has never come into force.
47
[Proposed] Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract § 3.7(a) (ii) 42 (2008) (on file with author).
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The contracts treat the government more as a private landlord. There is a
difference, however, in limiting the right of a landlord to enter a tenant’s property and
limiting the government from entering a privatized highway to deal with events such as
emergencies. The Commonwealth’s right to enter is heavily constrained by limits and
exceptions that can become a “Compensation Event” requiring the government to pay
“Concession Compensation” to the contractor. It is helpful to read some short excerpts as
background for understanding the effects these terms can have:
“Concession Compensation” means, with respect to a Compensation
Event, compensation payable by the Commonwealth to the Concessionaire
in order to restore the Concessionaire to the same after-Tax economic
position that the Concessionaire would have been in if such Compensation
Event had not occurred . . . .48
“Compensation Event” means (i) any applicable entry on the Turnpike by
the Commonwealth pursuant to Section 3.7(a)(v) through Section
3.7(a)(ix), provided that the Concessionaire’s use of the Turnpike as a
highway is materially impaired resulting in Losses or reduced Turnpike
Revenues, (ii) the Concessionaire’s compliance with or the
implementation of a Required Modification pursuant to Section 5.2, (iii)
the Concessionaire’s compliance with or the implementation of any
modified or changed Operating Standard (as contemplated by Section
6.3(b)), (iv) the termination of an agreement with a Vendor as
contemplated in Section 7.2(d), (v) the occurrence of an Adverse Action
as contemplated in Article 14, (vi) the circumstances described in each of
Section 2.5(i), Section 4.1(a), Section 4.2, Section 5.2 and Section 15.2(d),
(vii) any breach of the covenant set forth in Section 3.10(b) or (viii) the
occurrence of a Commonwealth Default as contemplated in Article 16.49

¶24

¶25

These clauses are not easy reading even for attorneys. They must be interpreted by
referring to many other parts of the contract, which, in turn, require referring to other
sections. Many of the terms have special meanings that require referring to the contract’s
lengthy definition section. Other difficulties arise from terms such as “material” and
“breach.” They are legal terms of art, and they are also highly subjective concepts. Thus,
contract terms that are included to provide the contractor with certainty that it will receive
its anticipated revenue create new uncertainties for the government and the public.
In these days of serial contracting,50 it may be difficult for a state to directly
control the actions of those who perform duties in the name of the public or on behalf of
the private contractor. For example, it has long been common to hire general and subcontractors to handle construction, repairs, and other specialized tasks. But what happens
48

[Proposed] Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract Definition § 6 (2008) (on file with author).
Id.
50
Private or public entities may contract out a project or specific functions in areas where they lack
expertise, where another entity can do the work for less, where a task is short term, where there is a hiring
freeze, or if, for other reasons, new employees cannot be hired. In recent years, it has become common for
contractors to employ subcontractors to help carry out oversight and management of these specific projects
or functions, thus increasing the structural complexity of projects.
49
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when a state or local government that has privatized a road has also contracted out its
services for dealing with an emergency? How can the state or local government ensure
that entry onto the highway by contractors hired to do a specific job does not cause a
compensation event? How can the government ensure that its private emergency
contractor gives notice reasonable under the circumstances? The possibilities for a
complex chain of litigation are obvious. It is, therefore, no surprise that Mayer Brown, a
law firm with an international privatization practice, promotes both its transactional and
litigation experience in this area.51
“Compensation events” arise from what, before privatization, were simple acts
whose sole purpose was the upkeep of the infrastructure or public safety needs, such as
inspecting the quality of the roadbed or responding to emergencies. Chicagoans learned
about compensation events when CBS reported that the city’s parking meter contract
required reimbursement for events like repairing streets. Public records showed that in
the first quarter of 2009, the city was liable to the parking meter contractor for more than
$106,000 in lost income during the slow months for street repair and street closings for
festivals, parades, and holidays, as well as repairs and maintenance. At that rate, it is not
unreasonable to predict that Chicago will owe roughly $500,000 a year to the private
contractor.52 However, in some areas where parking rates are higher or where paid
parking hours are longer, reimbursements could be much higher.53 A lawyer suing the
city over the parking meter deal estimated that it could cost “$559,057 a year, or about
$8,000 a space” to reimburse the company if the 68 “most valuable spaces in the city . . .
were out for a year.”54 Thus, while the city would receive less revenue when parking
meters are out of service due to repairs, the contractor’s revenues continue.
Moreover, infrastructure privatization contracts mean that even basic maintenance
can create situations under which a government entity owes compensation to private
contractors. Had the legislature approved it, the proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike
contract would have required the Commonwealth to pay the private contractor if entry
onto the Turnpike by the Commonwealth was not at a reasonable time or if the
Commonwealth had failed to give reasonable prior notice. Indeed, even though the
contract says that the Commonwealth can enter the Turnpike to respond to emergencies,
those rights are limited by conditions that can require compensation. For example,
§ 3.7(a)(iii) allows access by emergency crews, but only if the Commonwealth
reasonably believes that an emergency exists, that the situation is defined in the contract
as one permitting entry, and the method of entry complies with other parts of the contract,
51

“We carry out contract and bid-form drafting, as well as the preparation of most construction-related
agreements, forms and documents. Additionally, we offer a strong litigation practice to assist in
construction auditing and with representing clients in the trial of complex design and construction claims.
These consulting, negotiation and contracting services have included sophisticated risk and risk-avoidance
advice.” MAYER BROWN, FACT SHEET: TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PORTS, PORT-RELATED
FACILITIES AND INTERMODAL PROJECTS 2 (2009),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/infrastructure/MB_Transportation_Infrastructure.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2010) [hereinafter MAYER BROWN FACT SHEET].
52
Parking Meter Firm Gets Paid Even When Streets Closed, CHI. PRESS RELEASE SERVICES,
http://chicagopressrelease.com/press-releases/parking-meter-firm-gets-paid-even-when-streets-are-closed
(last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
53
See id.
54
Id.
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including giving notice that is “practicable under the circumstances.” Consider the worst
case scenario of a national emergency. When no infrastructure privatization contracts are
involved, emergency responders can focus solely on how best to cope with the situation.
When a highway is privatized, emergency responders must parse contract language and
negotiate that access be given even to people who have no transponder or money to pay
the toll.
Clashes between the private sector and public welfare are not hypothetical
concerns. For example, in 2006, the Indiana Toll Road contractor installed sand-filled
barrels in Toll Road turn-arounds to prevent drivers from using them.55 However, those
turn-arounds were created to get emergency crews to accidents as quickly as possible.
State officials and emergency services were not consulted or even informed of the
decision to block the turn-arounds, and it was months before the contractor agreed to
remove the barrels.56 These problems could have been avoided had the contractor met its
contractual obligation to prepare an emergency response plan for the Toll Road. Thus,
privatizing the road left the public with less protection and with its needs for safety not
being taken into consideration, despite the requirements of the Toll Road lease.57
Contract provisions also create conditions that pit profits against public safety. For
example, § 3.7 of the Pennsylvania Turnpike contract permits entry onto the road for
specific purposes, such as ensuring compliance with safety requirements or in the case of
emergencies. However, the contract terms mean that performing those public safety
functions may impose extra costs on the government. It must read the contract carefully,
adjust the way it performs its functions to avoid incurring an obligation to compensate the
private contractor, and budget for Concession Compensation.
Fear of litigation and of the cost of litigation increases when it is difficult to
determine rights.
Infrastructure privatization contracts contain exceptions upon
exceptions, complex language, and subjective standards that require that government alter
and limit the way it acts. Thus, when faced with a claim for compensation for an
unreasonable entry by a contractor with deep experience administering these contracts,
the government, which lacks expertise in this area, may feel forced to settle rather than
incur the cost of litigating and losing. However, if settlements are reached without
evidence that proves an obligation to pay and that specific revenues have been lost, the
government may have overpaid.
Indeed, the occurrence of events, such as the flooding that required using the
Indiana Toll Road for evacuation, is predictable and should not impose costs on the
55

Joshua Stowe, U-Turn Safety Barriers on Toll Road Finished: Emergency Crews Still Training on
Median Bypass, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (INDIANA), Nov. 11, 2006 at B-3; Abigail Field, Legislative Advocate,
N.J. Pub. Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Presentation to the IMN National Public-Private
Partnership Symposium (March 30, 2007), available at http://www.njpirg.org/issues/save-ourturnpike/njpirg-citizen-lobbys-presentation-to-the-imn-national-public-private-partnership-symposiummarch-30-2007-washingtond.c?__utma=1.1466379737.1290455600.1290455600.1290455600.1&__utmb=1.4.10.1290455600&__utm
c=1&__utmx=&__utmz=1.1290455600.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=%28organic%29|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=indiana%2
0toll%20road%20turn%20arounds%20blocked%20avoid%20tolls&__utmv=-&__utmk=121018632.
56
Theodore Kim, States Considering Privatizing Highways Can Study Indiana Toll Road Experience, USA
TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, at 10A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-16-indianaroads_x.htm.
57
Stowe, supra note 55.
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government. Businesses have deep experience in protecting themselves from devastating
losses caused by weather or other disasters. One way is to factor these events into the
cost of the contract as part of doing due diligence. In addition, prudent people and
institutions purchase insurance to cover these sorts of contingencies. Privatization
contractors should do the same rather than making the government their insurer. It may
even be that the contractor has done its due diligence and included these events in its
assessment of costs and benefits. If so, the contractor is paid twice, and the public’s
financial benefit from the contract is decreased.
But far more serious is the effect of concession compensation on the protections
the public expects from government. Consider the effect on the right of fire, police, and
medical crews to enter a road to deal with emergencies when there is no contract and no
charge for entry.58 Consider the effect on them when that right of entry is lost unless the
Commonwealth uses “its reasonable efforts to minimize (i) the duration and scope of any
such declaration and (ii) the adverse impact that any such declaration may have on the
Turnpike Operations.”59 State, county, and city attorneys will have been briefed on their
obligations. They, in turn, must instruct police, emergency, and fire departments that,
when there is an accident on the Turnpike, emergency responders must consider more
than just getting to the scene as quickly as possible to render aid. Rather, they will be
instructed that they must, in every instance, make “reasonable efforts” to minimize the
impact of their efforts on Turnpike tolls and to document how their actions have
minimized any negative effects. The result will be hesitation and new obligations that
can slow and impede emergency responses. Equally likely is that there will be no
instruction, and eventually, when a compensation claim is made, the public will learn that
it costs more money to respond to emergencies and to provide for the public welfare.
B. Noncompetition Agreements: Hidden Costs of Infrastructure Privatization

¶33

¶34

Destroying competition would seem to undermine the basic argument for private
operation: being able to choose goods and services from among competitors in the free
market spurs better performance and drives down costs. Indeed, it is choice and
competition that provide accountability in the private sector.60 Noncompetition
provisions, however, forbid competition and do away with choice. As a result, they
eliminate these important spurs to better performance and lower cost. Despite this, a
2004 U.S. Department of Transportation report said that the powers of a state’s lead
agency responsible for promoting public-private partnerships “should include the power .
. . to establish a geographic noncompete zone.”61
Although noncompete provisions are commonly found in infrastructure
privatization agreements, they are not limited to privatized roads. Denver’s E-470 was
58

Proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike Contract § 3.18 (2008) (on file with author).
Id.
60
See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 136–48 (2006) (contrasting private versus public sector accountability).
61
U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2004) [hereinafter
DOT REPORT], available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/pppdec2004/; see also EDWARD FISHMAN,
NATIONAL COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL
RESEARCH DIGEST 51 35–36 (James B. McDaniel ed. 2009) [hereinafter NCHRP REPORT], available at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_lrd_51.pdf (noting that the private equity and its financial
backers often view noncompete agreements as essential).
59
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built by a consortium of local governments, and their agreement required lowering speed
limits on nearby Tower Road from 55 to 40 m.p.h. and installing stop lights on 96th,
104th, and 112th Avenues.62 Indeed, noncompetition provisions are included in
infrastructure privatization contracts in the United States and abroad, and actions to
discourage drivers from using alternate roads are regularly taken in order to make the
privatized road the only option.
Another common method of eliminating competition is “traffic calming.” In
Sydney, Australia, for example, a community liaison group member testified that the
narrowing of lanes on adjacent, free roads came as a shock to area residents:
‘Suddenly overnight, like mushrooms, concrete barriers are built,’
Suzanne O’Connor testified. ‘They were very keen on traffic calming,
which apparently is jargon for funneling. So there was a lot of jargon, a
lot of English being abused, again I think . . . in an attempt to keep the
implications hidden.’63

¶36

If conditions on potential competing roads or other infrastructure are sufficiently
unpleasant, the effect of a noncompete provision can be achieved, even if none is
included in the contract.
An example of another anti-competitive measure whose effects are similar to
traffic calming is a contract provision that allowed a private contractor to build express
toll lanes in the median of California SR-91, but forbade the government from
performing repairs and upkeep on the parallel public, nontolled lanes:
Despite the successful implementation of the SR-91 Express Lanes
project, the PPP arrangement ran into problems several years later as
concerns grew about the contractual restrictions on capacity improvements
in the absolute protection zone and changes in the ownership of the private
consortium. Several lawsuits were filed against Caltrans and the private
contractor as a result of the noncompete restriction, and Caltrans
ultimately was forced to make improvements to the tollfree lanes on SR91. In 2002, as a result of the lawsuits and growing public opposition, the
California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1010 (AB 1010) which
authorized OCTA [Orange County Transportation Authority] to buy out
the private franchise, eliminated the absolute protection zone, and required
the facility to become toll-free at the end of the 35-year term. AB 1010

62

Colorado City Ruins Road to Boost Toll Revenue: Commerce City, Colorado Non-Compete Agreement
Lowered the Speed Limit and Installed Unneeded Traffic Signals to Force People onto the E-470 Toll
Road, THENEWSPAPER.COM, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/05/599.asp; see Texas:
Speed Limit May be Lowered to Boost Toll Revenue, THENEWSPAPER.COM, Oct. 19, 2007,
http://thenewspaper.com/news/20/2025.asp.
63
Australia: Traffic Lights Modified to Funnel Traffic Into Toll Tunnel, THENEWSPAPER.COM, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/09/936.asp; see also Elliott D. Sclar, Professor of Urban Planning,
Sch. of Int’l and Pub. Affairs, Columbia Univ., Address to the Association of Collegiate Schools of
Planning: The Political-Economics of Private Infrastructure Finance: The New Sub Prime 14–16 (Oct 1,
2009) [hereinafter Sclar Address] (describing commonly used methods of coercing drivers to use privatized
toll roads).
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prohibits OCTA from transferring the franchise and prohibits Caltrans
from entering new franchise agreements without legislative approval.64
¶37

The public has also tended to react negatively to anticompetitive actions, such as
traffic calming. In its 2009 comments to proposals to build a new private highway, the
City of Golden, Colorado wrote:
The Transportation Commission is being tempted by . . . the suggestion
that there is “free” money available from potential investors in the
Jefferson Parkway. However, the Study makes clear that the “free”
money comes at the very high cost of eliminated highway capacity,
increased congestion and degradation of highway safety. . . . The Study’s
euphemism of “traffic calming” really means reducing the speeds and
capacity on Indiana, a street which drivers have paid for with their tax
dollars and currently enjoy today. This forces drivers to choose between
paying a toll to go out of their way or be stuck in congestion on the
unnecessarily “calmed” rural stretch of Indiana Street.
. . . [D]egraded roadway conditions and increased traffic congestion are]
an essential part of the JPPHA’s plan. Without these failing conditions,
little traffic would be induced to use the expensive Jefferson Parkway. . . .
By starving SH 93 and Arvada roadways of needed improvements, JPPHA
would ensure congestion and push some traffic to its road. However, what
is good for a road is not good for drivers. The goal of state highway
access should be to promote mobility, not to impair mobility to promote
the ability to toll a road.
....
This so-called “traffic calming” for Indiana is a transparent
euphemism for slowing down traffic to force drivers to use the toll road—
a classic congestion guarantee designed to artificially prop up revenue for
a private toll road operator. The Institute of Transportation Engineers
defines traffic calming as follows: “Traffic calming involves changes in
street alignment, installation of barriers, and other physical measures to
reduce traffic speeds and/or cut-through volumes, in the interest of street
safety, livability, and other public purposes.” Traffic calming usually
involves reductions in lane width, speed bumps, introduced curves and
other measures to physically slow drivers. . . . [T]here is no transportation
justification for such measures on Indiana Street. . . . [T]his comes at a
high cost to all of the drivers forced to make a decision between wasted
time, wasted gasoline and tolls. . . . This means that drivers will replace

64

NCHRP REPORT, supra note 61, at 12. The American Trucking Association’s (ATA) list of conditions
necessary to protect the public interest includes banning noncompete clauses that forbid improvements on
competing highways. Id. at 19.
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current free and direct routes with costly routes that are likely to take them
out of their way and result in the consumption of extra fuel. 65

¶38

¶39

Yet despite public unhappiness, infrastructure privatization agreements typically forbid
building or improving competing infrastructure66 in order to leave no alternative to the
privatized infrastructure in order to guarantee the contractor’s revenues.67
Experience with competition between a privatized tollroad (M5) and a public road
in Hungary beginning in the mid-1990’s provides an example of how competition
between a toll and free road commonly play out. Avoidance of M5 eventually led the
government to agree to make up the private company’s lost revenues.68 Traffic on the
free roads near M5 increased 30% and eventually led the Government to subsidize both
local users and the private company.69 In short, despite coercing drivers to use a private
tollroad, efforts to protect the revenues of a private infrastructure contractor have often
not succeeded. Ironically, then, privatization, which governments have turned to as a
source for financing infrastructure, may actually exacerbate governments’ financial woes.
In its 2008 report, the Federal Highway Administration also advocated revenue
reimbursements to private contractors as an alternative to or in conjunction with
noncompetition agreements.70 The report explains that if steps are not taken to protect
contractors’ anticipated revenues, payments to the state will be lower.71 Strategies of
ensuring that governments do not take actions that decrease contractor revenues make it
harder for governments to protect the wider public interest. Indeed, government may
take actions whose effects include lowering private revenues, but government does not
take those actions in order to harm private contractors’ revenues. The difficulty is that
transportation systems do more than just transport people and goods from point A to
point B. They affect air, water, and soil quality; generate noise; and affect communities’
quality of life.
In the United States, approximately 28 percent of total greenhouse gas
emissions, which have been demonstrated to contribute significantly to
global climate change, are attributed to the transportation sector. Private

65

Letter from City of Golden to Chairman & Transp. Comm’rs, Transp. Comm’n of Colo., 1, 7, 11 (Jul. 22,
2009).
66
See U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, PRIVATE ROADS, PUBLIC COSTS: THE FACTS ABOUT TOLL ROAD
PRIVATIZATION AND HOW TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC Appendix A (2009), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/H5/Ql/H5Ql0NcoPVeVJwymwlURRw/Private-Roads-Public-Costs.pdf
(providing examples).
67
Pagano, supra note 11, at 373–74.
68
ÁRPÁD G. SIPOSS, TOLLING ON THE HUNGARIAN MOTORWAY NETWORK 6/14 (2005), available at
http://www.piarc.org/library/aipcr/2/96F0i2jcGYbBqRNJ9VIA3630.pdf. Other privatized Hungarian roads
encountered additional problems. See MICHAEL B. LIKOSKY, LAW, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 147–48 (2006).
69
World Bank, The Negative Revenue Effects of Parallel Roads in Mexico and Hungary, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/tr_docs/annex8.pdf.
70
See, e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INNOVATION WAVE: AN UPDATE ON THE
BURGEONING PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE IN U.S. HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT INFRASTRUCTURE 31, 61 (2008),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/pppwave/ppp_innovation_wave.pdf.
71
Id. at 61.
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vehicles are now the largest contributor to household ‘carbon footprint[,]’
accounting for 55 percent of carbon emissions from U.S. households.72
¶40

¶41

¶42

Thus, for the life of an infrastructure privatization contract, government
obligations to insure a contractor’s revenues complicate—and even eliminate—options
for addressing challenges, such as reducing air pollution, environmental degradation, and
urban and suburban congestion; mitigating greenhouse gases connected with global
climate change; promoting public health; and tackling other problems related to carfocused transportation.73
Recall that the Northwest Parkway contract imposed a financial penalty for
building or improving mass transit.74 The contracts for Virginia’s Pocahontas Parkway
and Chicago parking meters go farther. The Pocahontas Parkway requires that the
government “exercise all discretionary authority available to it under Laws, Regulations
and Ordinances to prevent any other governmental or private entity from developing
Competitive Transportation Facilities, including but not limited to connections to State
Highways.”75 The Chicago Parking Meter Contract requires the city to “use its
reasonable efforts to oppose and challenge such action by any such other Governmental
Authority; provided, however, that all reasonable out-of-pocket costs and expenses
incurred by the City in connection with such opposition or challenge shall be borne by
the Concessionaire.”76 In short, this contract requires that government act as an agent or
lobbyist for the private contractor—or pay for not making sufficient efforts. Thus, the
people’s interests are limited and constrained by those of the private contractor.
The GAO’s March 2009 review of surface transportation recognized government’s
struggle to accommodate many competing goals.77 Infrastructure privatization contract
terms that freeze the status quo for generations could leave us with obsolete
72

STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 2.
It is ironic, then, that the stated goals of the legislation proposed to permit privatizing Pennsylvania
highways were offered as “reasons for privatization . . . promises of ‘abating environmental pollution,
advancing energy efficiency and conservation, improving homeland security, increasing capacity . . . and
[raising] revenues available for public transportation purposes.’” Pagano, supra note 11, at 370–71; see
also Steven D. Cook, Climate Change: 29 Percent of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Come From
Transportation, Department Says 1 (BNA) IIPR 13, Apr. 26, 2010, available at
http://news.bna.com/iiln/IILNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=17012173&vname=iiprbulallissues&fn=17012
173&jd=a0c2v3k5a8&split=0.
74
See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
75
Agreements: Agreements Review: Pocahontas Parkway, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/agreements/pocahontas.htm. In the 2006 Pocahontas Parkway contract the
Virginia Department of Transportation acknowledged that an existing “competitive transportation facility
or the expansion of existing transportation facilities” so that they become a competitive transportation
facility “may adversely affect Toll Revenues.” Amended and Restated Comprehensive Agreement
(Related to the Grant of a Permit) to Develop and Operate the Route 895 Connector, between Virginia
Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of Virginia and Transurban (895) LLC, Art. 12.01(a) (June
29, 2006), available at
http://www.virginiadot.org/business/resources/Amended%20and%20Restated%20Comprehensive%20Agre
ement.pdf. Therefore, the Virginia DOT will owe compensation for lost revenues if it fails “to exercise
discretionary authority . . . available to it under Laws to prevent the development” of a competitive facility.
Id. at Art. 12.01(a)(iii)–(iv).
76
CHICAGO PARKING METER CONTRACT, supra note 6, § 14.5 (emphasis in original).
77
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-400, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: RESTRUCTURED
FEDERAL APPROACH NEEDED FOR MORE FOCUSED, PERFORMANCE-BASED, AND SUSTAINABLE PROGRAMS
26–28 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf.
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transportation or, at the least, supporting an expensive featherbedding system that
unnecessarily delays modernizing transportation. This was the case with Hungary’s M-5,
because it imposed private and localized impediments to regional planning and integrated
transportation systems.78
The inclusion of noncompetition and reimbursement terms in privatization
agreements alters governance in many ways. First, it creates divided loyalties for public
officials. Although public officials sign these agreements in order to serve the public’s
need and desire for transportation, the officials find themselves compelled to prevent or
impede public access to attractive transportation alternatives. It is no wonder that the
public has felt betrayed when it has learned of the existence of noncompete agreements.79
Second, these agreements constrain options for addressing critical problems and
public needs for generations. Across this country, state and local governments are the
vehicles by which to provide more urban green space, lower air and soil pollution,
walkable cities and to take other actions, such as those set out in PlaNYC’s ambitious
program.80 A truck and car-based transportation system that largely depends on oil and
gasoline makes the United States dependent on unstable suppliers, many of whom are in
conflict zones.81 A transportation system that was less dependent on petroleum could
lessen U.S. entanglement with unseemly actors. Achieving each of these goals requires
strategies that include less driving and, thus, less need for highways, parking meters, and
parking garages. However, standing in the way of achieving these goals that are vital to
our well-being are the costs of reimbursing private contractors for their projected lost
revenues.
Third, contracting with a government means having a party with the power to alter
conditions that directly affect the value of the contract to the other party. One of the
ways government can alter an infrastructure contract’s value is to build a competing
means of transportation, in the case of a highway, or parking facility, in the case of street
parking meters. Refusing to include a noncompetition agreement where the contractor
wants one is not an option if private contractors are to be willing to lease public
infrastructure.
This conflict could be resolved by accepting that a government may need to be
perpetually in breach of an infrastructure privatization contract, and, thus, must buy its
way out of obligations throughout the contract’s term. The Chicago parking meter
contract seems to contemplate exactly that situation in its provisions on “Reserved
Powers Adverse Actions.”82 However, rather than being a solution to the problem of
rigid contract terms that apply for generations, being in continual breach may be evidence
of the inadvisability of agreeing to these contracts. Certainly, to have governments
knowingly breach contracts is not good practice. Contract terms that hold back progress,
impose extra costs on the public, and even force suboptimal decisions are a high price to
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SIPOSS, supra note 68.
Daniel Sorid, Colorado Highway “Slowdown” Sparks Debate on Toll Roads, REUTERS, Aug 11, 2005.
80
PLANYC 2030, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Jan. 26,
2011).
81
See Recent Country Analysis Brief Updates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/newint.html.
82
See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONTRACT, supra note 6, § 14.3.
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pay for financing infrastructure. This is especially true when there are other, better
options for raising money.
We seem to have forgotten that federal, state, and local governments have long
financed public works and other needs without turning to privatization. The two main
options for financing infrastructure have long been taxes and the issuance of bonds, and
that is still the case. As of 2008, more than 50,000 state and local entities had issued
municipal securities and more than 2 million separate bond issues were outstanding.83
Indeed, according to the GAO: “A number of alternative financing mechanisms—such as
enhanced private-sector participation, bonds, loans, and credit assistance—can be used to
help state and local governments finance surface transportation. These financing
mechanisms, where appropriate, could help meet growing and costly transportation
demands.”84 In fact, although highway privatization receives a great deal of attention,
public money continues to be far more important in providing transportation
infrastructure. A 2009 study found that only ten percent of the $126.6 billion spent on
transportation infrastructure in 2007 was provided by private funding.85 In recent years,
however, the federal government promoted highway privatization by creating new
financial instruments and creating tax breaks to private contractors to make privatization
attractive. The two primary financial subsidies allow contractors to issue tax-free bonds
and take highly accelerated depreciation and amortization of costs.
First, the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) extended the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds from
public to private entities that were seeking to fund infrastructure privatization. The new
instrument was called “Private Activity Bonds” or PABs. Although SAFETEA-LU
limited the total amount of private activity transportation bonds to $15 billion, the ability
to offer investors tax exemptions on their interest made PABs attractive and substantially
lowered the cost of raising private capital.86 At the same time, however, tax-exempt
83

Susan Chandler, What Happens When the City Leases Public Assets to Private Investors? You Pay a Lot
More, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2008, at C-1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-0907/news/0809070213_1_midway-airport-lease-luggage.
84
GAO REPORT HIGHWAY TRUST FUND, GAO-09-845T, supra note 17, at 1, 10; see Ellen Dannin & Lee
Cokorinos, Infrastructure Privatization in the United States in the New Millennium, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2011),
for an overview of the government provisions commonly used in financing highway privatization.
85
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE & JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUBSIDIZING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
WITH TAX-PREFERRED BONDS 4 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10667/10-26TaxPreferredBonds.pdf.
86
BENJAMIN G. PEREZ & JAMES W. MARCH, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE: TRENDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (2006),
available at
http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/Background%20Documents/perez_banff_ppp_final.pdf.
Perez and March’s paper was presented at the First International Conference on Funding Transportation
Infrastructure, Institute of Public Economics at the University of Alberta, Banff Centre, Alberta, Canada.
Id.; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-56-08, OVERVIEW OF SELECTED TAX PROVISIONS RELATING
TO THE FINANCING OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 15–18 (2008), available at
http://www.jct.gov/x-56-08.pdf; Tony Furst, HOFM Director, Federal Highway Administration,
Presentation, Freight Provisions in SAFETEA-LU (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/freightplanning/safetea_lu.htm (noting that private activity bonds enable loans for
these projects at a lower interest as the purchasers of bonds don’t have to pay federal taxes on the incomes
they receive). Tax-exempt bonds have also been made available to private contractors operating municipal
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bonds will lower government revenues and, thus, contribute to government revenue
shortfalls and to some degree prompt governments to seek solutions such as privatization.
A second support for infrastructure privatization is provided by tax deductions that
allow investors to take deductions for highly accelerated depreciation on infrastructure.
It is these tax deductions that drive the multi-decade length of infrastructure privatization
contracts. Investors may take those deductions, however, only when they have effective
ownership of the property. Effective ownership is demonstrated when the contract term
exceeds the useful economic life of the property. In other words, the multi-decade
contracts that distort governance exist so that the private contractors can qualify for tax
deductions that will attract investors. In fact, to further ensure that the transaction is
viewed as transferring effective ownership to the private contractor, sections 2.8 of the
Indiana Toll Road and of the proposed 2008 Pennsylvania Turnpike contract say that the
parties intend the transaction to be a sale for tax purposes in substantially similar
language.
However, it is puzzling that the contract terms far exceed the actual useful life of
highways and streets.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates the service life of
highways and streets to be 45 years, while the Chicago Skyway and
Indiana Toll Road agreements were for terms of 99 and 75 years,
respectively. . . . [W]hile the facts and circumstances of each transaction
will control its tax treatment, these arrangements will most likely be
viewed by the parties as a sale and purchase of a trade or business, and the
concession agreement can be expected to include a provision describing
the intended tax treatment in this manner.87
Senator Jeff Bingaman, correctly characterized these multi-generation contracts as not a
lease but as “essentially sell off vital components of the interstate highway system.”88 It

water systems. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The States’ Role in
Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 571–72 (2005).
87
Tax and Financing Aspects of Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Energy, Natural Res. and Infrastructure of the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement of
Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072408ektest.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-08-1052T, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, SECURING POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST COULD RESULT FROM MORE RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS 7–8
(2008) (JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081052t.pdf (discussing the financial tradeoffs of privatization); JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF SELECTED TAX PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OF
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 86. The testimony of the other witnesses at that
hearing, which was chaired by Senator Jeff Bingaman, is also very useful for understanding highway
financing. See Tax and Financing Aspects of Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Energy, Natural Res. and Infrastructure of the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 5 (2008)
(statement of Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=8387f870-43c1-48e7-977b-de66a7dbc9f8.
88
Tax and Financing Aspects of Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Energy, Natural Res. and Infrastructure of the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (opening
statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), Chairman, Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Res. and
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is an open question why the terms are roughly double the time needed to qualify for
effective ownership and the deduction.
The goal of that sell off is to entice investors by ensuring that they will make
money by being able to claim a full tax deduction for the asset’s depreciation within the
first fifteen years of the lease agreement. It may be that having lease terms almost double
the life of the infrastructure is intended to allow generations of investors to serially take
advantage of the deduction. In fact, these deductions have been important incentives to
encourage the private sector to invest in infrastructure privatization.89
Even the GAO, which has issued many studies of highway finance, was unaware
of this tax deduction and of its effects. The GAO learned about the deduction from an
official involved in private infrastructure investment:
According to the Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Skyway,
‘concession rights’ is treated as an Internal Revenue Code section 197
intangible and is amortized in 15 years, regardless of the lease term or the
useful life of the asset. However, costs allocated to “tangible assets” are
subject to the normal depreciation rules. This official also told us that
about $1.5 billion of the Chicago Skyway lease amount was for
concession rights, and $334 million was allocated to the tangible asset.90

¶53

The second financing incentive that attracts investment in infrastructure is tax-free
bonds. The amounts involved are not trivial:
The amount of tax-preferred debt issued to finance new infrastructure
projects undertaken by the public and private sectors totaled $1.7 trillion
from 1991 to 2007. About three-quarters of those bond proceeds, or
roughly $1.3 trillion, was for capital spending on infrastructure by states
and localities, and the remainder was used to fund private capital
investment for projects that serve a public purpose, such as schools and
hospitals. That $1.3 trillion amounted to over one-half of the $2.3 trillion
in capital spending on infrastructure by state and local governments (that
is, net of federal grants and loan subsidies).91

¶54

Investors are attracted to tax-free bonds because they will not owe taxes on the
interest earned. Tax-free bonds are not cost-free to governments. Whether private or
public, there use in financing infrastructure means less tax revenue is collected by the
government and available to fund public needs. However, there are important differences
in the effects of private versus public tax-free bonds. When government foregoes tax
revenue on bonds, it does so to attract investors. As a result, the benefit and burden to
government balance out. But this is not the case when government loses tax revenue on
Infrastructure), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=8387f870-43c1-48e7977b-de66a7dbc9f8.
89
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-44, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: MORE
RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD BETTER SECURE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 26–27 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0844.pdf.
90
Id. at 27 n.18.
91
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE & JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at vii.
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bonds issued by private contractors. In addition to lost revenues, PABs create a
competitor to government in the market for tax-free bonds and thus government has more
difficulty attracting investors.
Not only does government provide large financial subsidies to private
infrastructure investors, it does so at some risk. The Congressional Budget Office and
Joint Committee on Taxation warn:
Concerns about economic efficiency are particularly acute for the federal
tax preferences that help finance private-sector investment in
infrastructure, because those preferences risk transferring resources from
taxpayers to private investors without obtaining a commensurate payoff in
terms of the value of the infrastructure services that would not have been
provided without that subsidy. For example, the fact that those
infrastructure facilities are in private hands indicates that owners can
capture—through user fees and other charges—a sizable portion of the
value of the services they provide. Hence, public benefits from those
investments may be small relative to those of infrastructure owned and
operated by government, and determining the appropriate degree of
subsidy—or whether any is warranted—may be difficult. If the privatesector investment would have taken place even without a subsidy, then the
tax preference simply shifts resources from taxpayers to private investors.
Because tax preferences for private-sector borrowers lower the cost of
financing and hence the return needed to make an investment attractive,
they can also reallocate capital from profitable projects to projects that
otherwise would not have been undertaken, thereby potentially reducing
economic growth.92

¶56

Noncompete agreements and tax subsidies to induce private investment in
infrastructure concessions lead to the perverse result that state and local governments are
limited for decades in their ability to provide for the public welfare. They are limited,
first, in losing the ability to construct facilities to meet public needs if doing so violates
the contract. Second, they lose taxes from investor revenues, which, but for tax
deductions to induce investment in privatized infrastructure might have been invested in
taxable funds. Third, providing highly accelerated depreciation of infrastructure
investments impoverishes the federal government.
C. Adverse Actions—Contract Provisions That Affect Government Rights to Legislate
and Adjudicate

¶57

The “adverse action” provisions of the proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contract
require compensating the private contractor for “enacting any legislation or ordinance or
promulgating any rule or regulation” that principally affects the private contractor or
private toll road operators or is reasonably expected to have the effect of causing a
“material adverse effect on the fair market value” of the infrastructure.93 The
92
93

Id. at 7.
[Proposed] Pennsylvania Turnpike Agreement, § 14.1 89–90 (on file with author).
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Commonwealth of Virginia’s contract with Transurban of Australia and Fluor
Corporation of Texas to build high-occupancy toll lanes on the Capital Beltway requires
Virginia to reimburse the private companies whenever carpools exceed twenty four
percent of the traffic on the carpool lanes for the next forty years “or until the builders
make $100 million in profits.”94 Since carpoolers are exempt from tolls, those
reimbursements will have to come from the Commonwealth’s budget.95 That situation is
not without irony. “The project, in the works for nearly a decade, was planned as a way
for private companies to add capacity to one of the most congested roads in the country,
with little cost or risk to the public.”96
The contract for the now bankrupt97 San Diego South Bay Expressway (SR 125),
gives the private contractor the right to compensation if the state legislature, CalTrans,
any administrative body, or voters create a law in any form that leads to acquiring part of
the road, negatively affects the private contractor’s rights, or regulates or interferes with
its right to collect tolls. It is also entitled to compensation if any of those results are
caused by a court order, decree, or judgment.98
The Chicago parking meter contract does not forbid Chicago’s enacting laws or
taking actions that adversely affect contractor revenues, but it does allow the contractor to
charge Chicago for taking actions adverse to the private contractor’s receipt of its
expected revenues.99
Although the existence of adverse action rights and their effects are not widely
known by most people in the United States, similar provisions, known as “stabilization
clauses,” have long existed in contracts between nations and investors in order to protect
investors from the risk of nationalization or expropriation.100 Their purpose evolved to
protect international investments from risks associated with changes in laws, including
the application of international and domestic human rights and environmental laws. A
2008 research project on stabilization clauses conducted for the International Finance
Council and the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General on
Business and Human Rights found, among other things, that stabilization clauses were
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Amended and Restated Comprehensive Agreement (Related to the Grant of a Permit) to Develop and
Operate the Route 895 Connector, between Virginia Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of
Virginia and Transurban (895) LLC, supra note 75.
95
Eric M. Weiss, Toll-Lanes Contract Could Cost State—Deal to Allow Free Carpooling on Beltway
Project Might Leave Va. Owing Millions, WASH. POST, Jul. 20, 2008, at C06, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/19/AR2008071901651.html; see also
Kattula, supra note 9; Steve Kattula, Corporate Welfare and the Beltway HOT Lanes, Part 2: You Better
Not Carpool (Too Much), GREATER GREATER WASH., Nov. 11, 2009, available at
http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post.cgi?id=4041.
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Weiss, supra note 95.
97
Steve Schmidt, Toll Road Operator Files for Chapter 11 - South Bay Expressway Use below Forecasts,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., March 23, 2010, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/23/south-bay-expressway-builders-file-chapter-11/.
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FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., AGREEMENT REVIEW: SOUTH BAY EXPRESSWAY (SR 125), Sept. 2005, infra
Appendix.
99
See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONTRACT, supra note 6, § 14.3.
100
DOMINIC AYINE, ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV., LIFTING THE LID ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
CONTRACTS: THE REAL DEAL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 4 (2005), available at
http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?o=16007IIED (follow “Downloand PDF (free)” hyperlink).
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a risk-mitigation tool to protect foreign investments from such sovereign
risks as nationalization, expropriation, or the obsolescence bargain, in
which the host state can use changes in circumstances to impose new
requirements on investors. These clauses also may be designed to insulate
investors from environmental and social legislation, a matter of growing
economic significance to investors. Lenders often view stabilization
clauses as an essential element of the bankability of an investment project,
particularly in emerging markets, and they may insist that at least the
fiscal terms of an agreement be stabilized. Host states have viewed
stabilization clauses as a way to foster a favorable investment climate.101
¶61

¶62

These clauses are particularly attractive when long periods of time are needed to
recoup costs and become commercially viable.102 It is understandable why an
entrepreneur, entering into a multi-decade contract with a government, would want to
limit the state’s power to alter the terms of the agreement or existing opportunities for
making a profit by using its powers to legislate or adjudicate. However, stabilization
clauses can be and have been used to exempt firms from national and international law,
treaties, and standards,103 allowing private interests to trump public policy.
Critics of international stabilization clauses have advocated the need for
protections, including full and meaningful disclosure of stabilization clause terms, before
a contract is agreed to104 and the inclusion of language stating that the private contractors
refrain
from seeking or accepting exemptions in the statutory or regulatory
framework, including by way of government contracts, related to
environmental, health, safety, labour, taxation, financial incentives, or
other issues. MNEs [Multinational Enterprises] should refrain from
asserting or advancing any claim against a host government or another
party with respect to laws, regulations or measures relating to human
rights, health, safety or the environment.105

¶63

Stabilization clauses today take a variety of forms. A United Nations/IFC study of
stabilization clauses found clear differences in the degree to which the clauses exempted
companies from laws and the type of clause used in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries versus non-OECD countries. Contracts
with OECD countries tend to take the view that investors take the risk that laws of
101

ANDREA SHEMBERG, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESEARCH PROJECT CONDUCTED
FOR IFC AND THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS vii (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/St
abilization+Paper.pdf.
102
Id. at 5.
103
INT’L BAR ASS’N., WORKING GROUP ON THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES,
RESPONSE TO THE UK CONSULTATION ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN UPDATE OF THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 33 (2009), http://oecdwatch.org/publicationsen/Publication_3290/at_download/fullfile.
104
Id. at 19.
105
Id. at 33.
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general applicability will affect them and that compensation is available only for new
laws that have a discriminatory intent and effect as to the investor.106 “Investors are
expected to comply with all new laws, to absorb the costs of compliance with all
generally applicable laws. . . [and] to minimize costs arising from complying with
changes in law.”107
While clauses used in OECD countries either did not exempt companies from laws
or had only limited exemptions, stabilization clauses in contracts with non-OECD
countries did exempt companies from complying with changes in laws.108 The nonOECD countries most likely to have the clauses most protective of investor profits and
least deferential to the countries’ laws were contracts from Sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern, Southern Europe and Central Asia regions.109
There is some irony that a controversial tool now mostly used in developing
countries to exempt companies from the application of laws is standard in infrastructure
privatization contracts in the United States. But far more important than the insult to our
pride or our pocketbooks, these contracts elevate private contractors to a quasigovernmental status, giving them power over new laws, judicial decisions, propositions
voted on by the public, and other government actions that a contractor claims will affect
toll roads and revenues through the life of the contract.
Agreeing to include an adverse action provision in an infrastructure privatization
contract creates fundamental conflicts for governments. Legislative, executive, and
judicial bodies are bound to represent the public interest, faithfully execute the laws, and
apply and interpret law to adjudicate disputes. However, as with the other contract
provisions discussed, infrastructure privatization agreements will alter the roles
government entities play in important ways. As discussed above, it is not just the actual
payment of compensation that will affect conduct.110 The mere fear that compensation
could be owed or that there could be a legal battle can result in delegating legislative,
executive, and judicial powers to a private actor.111 State and local bodies must act with
an eye to the effects their decisions will have—or can be argued to have—on the
contractor’s revenues. Thus, by contract they must elevate those private interests above
others, public and private.
Seventy years ago, Professor Louis L. Jaffe provided an overview and meditation
on the operation and validity of allowing contract terms to oust government.112 Among
the issues Jaffee explored was whether to allow equivalent authority to be exercised by
private parties, since the State’s authority is based in the consent of those affected by
law.113 Jaffee also observed that, in many instances, the force of contract had been made
equivalent to law and even been allowed to oust government from acting. Meanwhile,
government was also required to enforce private terms through criminal and civil
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SHEMBERG, supra note 101, at xi.
Id. at xi.
108
Id. at ix, 10, 25.
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Id. at 33.
110
See supra Part. II.A.–B.
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See Dannin, supra note 60, at 130–31, 150–51, for a discussion of the non-delegation doctrine in the
context of privatization; see supra Part II.A.
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Louis L. Jaffee, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
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sanctions.114 At the same time, this privatized lawmaking was much more difficult to
attack than law enacted by governments.115 Jaffee’s insights from seventy years ago as to
the elevated status contract has given private individuals are certainly relevant today.
Had the Pennsylvania Turnpike lease been approved, legislation, administration,
enforcement, and adjudication of its law would have been altered for over three
generations. By the time the contract expired, decisions made and actions taken solely
because the contract required them would have permanently altered the state.
Meanwhile, we have decades to watch how events unfold in those states and cities that
privatized their infrastructure.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. Who Pays, How, and Why?
¶68

¶69

For many state and local governments that feel pinched financially, privatization
seems to be the only way to provide basic services and infrastructure while not raising
taxes. At the September 25, 2010 American Road and Transportation Builders
Association conference, aides from both political parties “acknowledged that, by
necessity, such public-private deals will play a part in future funding, especially in light
of the congressional reluctance to increase the gas tax that is the main source of federal
transportation revenue.”116 Kathy Dedrick, senior director for Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.),
Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee “said both
partnerships and tolling will be one part of many in the Senate bill.” 117
One government official explained the Commonwealth of Virginia’s decision to
enter into a highway privatization agreement this way:
“Is this the ideal way to build public infrastructure? No,” said
Gerald E. Connolly (D), chairman of the Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors. But he said that voters have turned down tax increases and
that the General Assembly has failed to come up with additional money.
“At some point, we have to find a way to fund public
infrastructure,” Connolly said.118

¶70

The consensus seems to be that there are few alternatives to privatization. “For
state and municipal governments strapped for cash to complete much-needed
infrastructure construction and maintenance, public-private partnerships (P3s)—where
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Id. at 217–19.
Id. at 216–21.
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See Adam Snider, Transportation: Highway, Transit Policy Bill Could Hamper Private-Sector
Investment, Republicans Say, BNA INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT & POLICY REPORT, Sept. 28, 2009,
http://news.bna.com/iiln/IILNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=15131241&vname=iiprbulallissues&fn=15131
241&jd=a0c0p0x6j1&split=0.
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Id.
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Weiss, supra note 95.
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authorities lease infrastructure assets to private parties, which then operate and design
them—are becoming more attractive.”119
However, would the states’ residents approve if they knew how much the public
invests in these deals? In the case of the Capitol Beltway, less than 20% of the upfront
funds came directly from the private investors. The rest was provided from government
funds or government subsidies, including low-interest loans, direct subsidies, tax
deductions, and other public sources:
Of the total $1.9 billion (and rising), Fluor-Transurban is contributing only
$349 million in private equity. Meanwhile, the state is paying $409
million and the Federal Highway Administration is lending Fluor $585
million in low-interest loans and $586 million in subsidized bonds.
Taxpayers are also on the hook every year for the next 40 years for the
carpool fees charged to the state account.120

¶72

¶73

Was it impossible to have gotten a better deal? Was this the only alternative?
Public officials may say that there are no alternatives because of public resistance
to taxes. They see privatization as providing improved infrastructure while not raising
taxes and as allowing the blame for unpopular decisions, such as imposing or raising tolls
or fees, to be shifted to a private contractor. Chicago officials, for example, contended
that “it would have been impossible for the City to have both kept the parking-meter
system and raised the rates to the same extent as the lease, because there was not
sufficient political will to do so . . . .”121 The Chicago Inspector General found these
claims to be untrue in the case of privatizing Chicago’s parking meters;122 however, a
study of Kansas policymakers concluded that the public is unlikely to support tolls to the
extent it sees tolls as taxes.123
Although opinion on the issue of the public’s acceptance of raising taxes is mixed,
the public has loudly opposed increased tolls and fees. That opposition does not mean
the public approves of public subsidies to privatize infrastructure. Rather, that
acceptance is more likely the result of the public’s lack of information. In any case, fear
of citizen resistance to and retaliation for raising taxes is an important factor in decisions
to privatize infrastructure.124 “Given that the option of raising taxes to fund an increasing
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Joshua Hamerman, More Infrastructure Privatization Coming; Latest Chicago Deal Highlights the
Growth of a Developed Market for Infrastructure Privatization in the US, 74 INV. DEALERS’ DIG. 3 (2008).
120
Kattula, supra note 9 (emphasis in original); see Steve Kattula, Corporate Welfare and the Beltway HOT
Nov. 9, 2009,
Lanes,
Part 1:
No
Free
Lunch,
GREATER GREATER WASH.,
http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post.cgi?id=4011.
121
CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
122
Id. at 5.
123
KANSAS POLICYMAKER REPORT, supra note 21, at 4-36.
124
Anyone for US PPP? Catherine McGuirk talks to US Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters, PROJECT
FINANCE June 2008; Tom Barnes, Turnpike Lease Looks Good on Paper: Rendell Advisers Present a Study
Seeing Potential for Big Profits, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 22, 2007,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07142/788007-147.stm; Leslie Wayne, Politics and the Financial Crisis
Slow the Drive to Privatize, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 5, 2009, at B-3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/economy/05private.html.
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number of transportation projects remains politically radioactive, policymakers continue
to pursue a range of alternate funding mechanisms and P3s are a critical trend here.”125
Public officials need to rethink their duties. They have an obligation to enquire
into the extent to which public subsidies fund infrastructure privatization. In addition to
knowing the details of infrastructure privatization deals, public officials owe their
constituents information, including education about the full effects of infrastructure
privatization on public budgets, governance, and democracy. Elliot Sclar refers to the
dearth of public information on the consequences of these decisions as “the democracy
question”:
The democracy question, or more accurately what I would call the
non-democracy question, is central to the creation of P3s. When
infrastructure is privatized (or corporatized), the decisions about its size,
shape and placement are driven by market demand. The private partners
are interested in elements of infrastructure that can yield the longest and
strongest streams of privately capturable revenue not the ones that yield
the largest public benefits.
. . . Because the interests of the private partners in the placement of
infrastructure and their concerns about protecting their revenue streams
come to dominate the local discourse the planning approach begins to shift
from one in which a comprehensive view of the urban space is replaced by
one that views the space as a collection of individual projects that each
have to be nurtured separately in terms of the rates of investment return
that are pledged to the private owners of the concession for however long
the concession lasts.126

¶75

¶76

In states and cities across the country, important factors affecting decisions to
privatize are contract terms that allow investors in private sector infrastructure projects to
expect fifteen percent returns. Sitting on one side of the table are highly educated and
trained analysts with international experience on privatization deals. Sitting across the
table are public representatives and administrators who may be involved in negotiating
only one such project in their lives and who rely on a staff that is unlikely to have been
trained in areas such as specialized tax law and its effects on costs, probability and
computer analysis, and mathematical modeling. The Federal Highway Administration
would be a logical source for advice, but it has long taken a strong pro-privatization
position and not given balanced advice about contract terms or finance.
The recent Michigan House legislative analysis of a bill regulating public-private
partnerships relied on an FHWA description of PPPs as eliminating risk: “All PPPs share
a common feature: As compared to traditional procurement methods all PPPs transfer risk
from the public owner of transportation facility to the contractor.”127 The current version
125

S. Legislative Conference, Public Private Partnerships, Remarks of Sujit M. CanagaRetna before the
Idaho Senate Task Force on Treasure Valley Transportation Issues (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.slcatlanta.org/Publications/EconDev/2007_Idaho_speech.shtml.
126
Sclar Address, supra note 63, at 12–13.
127
TRANSPORTATION—PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENTS, A SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 4961 AS REPORTED
FROM COMMITTEE 4-19-10, MICH. H. LEG . ANALYSIS SECTION (2010),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/billanalysis/House/htm/2009-HLA-4961-3.htm.
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on the FHWA website says: “Toll roads typically use P3s to shift a substantial portion of
the risk of meeting these requirements directly to the private sector entity performing the
activities and do so in arrangements most able to reduce the risk of non-performance.128
The FHWA report Michigan relied upon in drafting its PPP legislation suggests that
states will avoid the risks of unforeseen costs if their highways are privatized.129 The
current FHWA statement on risk, though more nuanced, also suggests risks to the public
will be substantially reduced if the highways are privatized.130 Nothing at the FHWA
website, however, warns that language commonly found in infrastructure privatization
contracts shifts substantial risk—and costs—to the public while also limiting the state and
local government’s ability to make policy decisions.
B. Government Advisors’ Incentives to Recommend Privatization
¶77

The pay of those who advise governments about infrastructure privatization
decisions are often dependent on consummating a privatization deal. For example,
Morgan Stanley’s compensation as an advisor on the Pittsburgh parking garage deal
depended on consummating the deal. In the end, it was paid $3 million from the
proceeds of the deal. 131 Morgan Stanley was also paid on a success-fee basis as advisor
to Governor Rendell on the Pennsylvania Turnpike deal.132 When Pennsylvania
legislators objected that the payment created an incentive to “‘recommend the largest
transaction possible rather than a course of action which may be more balanced and more
prudently serve the needs of the Commonwealth and its residents,’” the governor’s
budget secretary said that the payment structure did not violate conflict-of-interest law.133
128

Innovative Program Delivery: Public Private Partnerships: FAQs, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter
FHA FAQs], http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/faqs/index.htm. The FHWA’s publication on international
infrastructure privatization provides more discussion of the role of risk. For example, it says, “Long-term
risk assumption by the private partner is seen as a driver of innovative project concepts and solutions.”
And, “All public agencies visited emphasized effective risk allocation as an important aspect of a PPP
project. If significant risks throughout the project’s life cycle are not transferable to the private sector, then
the project is likely not an appropriate candidate for delivery via PPP.” FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FHWAPL-09-010, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE: CAPITALIZING ON
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 21, 25 (2009),
http://international.fhwa.dot.gov/links/pub_details.cfm?id=642 (follow “PDF Version” hyperlink).
129
See FHA FAQs, supra note 128; TRANSPORTATION—PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENTS, A SUMMARY OF
HOUSE BILL 4961 AS REPORTED FROM COMMITTEE, supra note 127.
130
See FHA FAQs supra note 128; Innovative Program Delivery: Public Private Partnerships: FAQs, FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/faqs/index.htm.
The FHWA’s publication on
international infrastructure privatization provides more discussion of the role of risk. For example, it says,
“Long-term risk assumption by the private partner is seen as a driver of innovative project concepts and
solutions.” FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FHWA-PL-09-010, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR HIGHWAY
INFRASTRUCTURE: CAPITALIZING ON INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 21, 25 (2009),
http://international.fhwa.dot.gov/links/pub_details.cfm?id=642 (follow “PDF Version” hyperlink). And,
“All public agencies visited emphasized effective risk allocation as an important aspect of a PPP project. If
significant risks throughout the project’s life cycle are not transferable to the private sector, then the project
is likely not an appropriate candidate for delivery via PPP.” Id.
131
Adam Brandolph, 2 Law Firms Hired in Pittsburgh Parking Authority Privatization Move, PITT. TRIB.REV., Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/pittsburgh/s_663520.html.
132
Joe Grata, $2.1 Million for Lease Advice Goes to Firm Tied to Rendell, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 15,
2008, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08136/881981-147.stm.
133
Paul Nussbaum, Turnpike Lease Plan Sent to Pa. Legislature: Gov. Rendell’s Proposal to Raise Money
for State Transportation Projects Faces Major Opposition, PHIL. INQUIRER, May 22, 2007,
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In addition to avoiding the legislators’ concern, the Rendell administration also took the
position that success fees were standard in these types of transactions.134 Using as its
standard whether the payment format created a conflict of interest also ignored a higher
and different standard—the government’s obligation to promote the public interest. And
although success fees may be commonly used, prevalence of usage says nothing about
whether success fees create inappropriate incentives. The Republican legislators also
objected that, in addition to the payment system, “Morgan Stanley could wind up as the
investment banker for the project, working for the successful bidder and earning even
more money.”135 Although it would not technically be payment for its reaching a deal,
being given that position as a result of work on the deal would certainly be a financial
reward for Morgan Stanley.
A governor considering privatizing infrastructure certainly needs knowledgeable
advisors. If that knowledge is limited only to finance and structuring deals and if that
expertise is rewarded only if a deal is consummated, important considerations are left out
of the decision-making process. If there is no advisor charged with and rewarded for
representing the public interest or with ensuring that full information and points of view
be considered, then the decision to privatize is all but inevitable.
Political leaders ignore the public interest at their peril. Reactions discussed
throughout this Article have shown that when the citizenry has been kept in the dark and
when the public interest has been ignored, people have been deeply indignant. They are
likely to be concerned that a fair process be used in making such an important decision.
It is possible that people may decide that privatizing public infrastructure is the best
alternative for many reasons. They may also decide to reject agreements that put
infrastructure, paid for with public funds, under private control. People may also reject
contracts that give such strong protection for contractor revenues and place limits on
governmental decision making.
Without information, however, people cannot
meaningfully participate in these important decisions.
C. The Infrastructure Privatization Revolving Door

¶80

Consider also the infrastructure contractor / investor / advisor revolving door.
Governor Rendell relied on Morgan Stanley and the law firm of Mayer Brown as his
advisors during the Pennsylvania Turnpike privatization process.136 Both were among
the forty-eight firms that had originally submitted expressions of interest in making a

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/home_top_stories/20070522_Turnpike_lease_plan_sent_to_Pa__legislature
.html#ixzz16nAFbuO7.
134
Press Release, Governor Rendell Announces Selection of Financial Adviser for Transportation Funding
Options, Morgan Stanley & Co. to Analyze All Options, Including Turnpike’s Proposal (Mar. 29, 2007)
(on file with author).
135
Tom Barnes, Turnpike Lease Looks Good on Paper: Rendell Advisers Present a Study Seeing Potential
for Big Profits, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 22, 2007, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07142/788007147.stm.
136
Brian Baxter, Mayer Brown, Ballard Spahr Advising Pennsylvania on Turnpike Privatization, AM LAW
DAILY, May 19, 2008, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/mayer-brown-bal.html; Joe
Grata, $2.1 Million for Lease Advice Goes to Firm Tied to Rendell, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 15, 2008,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08136/881981-147.stm; Paul Nussbaum, Morgan Stanley Chosen to
Advise on Road Leasing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 30, 2007.
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formal bid on the Turnpike.137 Both have served as international and domestic advisors
to governments, private contractors, and infrastructure investment groups.138 It makes
sense to hire an advisor with experience and expertise in putting together the terms of
complex infrastructure deals.
Morgan Stanley, through its various components, certainly has deep expertise
related to infrastructure privatization. For example, in October 2006, Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure and contractor LAZ were awarded the ninety-nine year lease for Chicago’s
parking garages. Two years later, in 2008, Morgan Stanley was part of a consortium
called Chicago Parking Meters, LLC that leased Chicago’s parking meters for 75
years.139 While advising Governor Rendell on the Pennsylvania Turnpike deal, Morgan
Stanley was also amassing over $4 billion in the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners
investment fund.140 There is no doubt that Morgan Stanley had relevant experience and
expertise. The problem is not whether that experience, gained while performing each of
these roles provides important insights into deals, but whether those multiple ongoing
roles also create actual or potential conflicts of interest.141 Indeed, at the time the
Turnpike deal was pending, people pointed out that Morgan Stanley’s various
involvements created incentives that undercut its independent judgment and ability to act
on behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.142
Ethical standards, such as those of the American Bar Association, for lawyers and
Rule 10(b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Act,143 warn against engaging in certain
conduct,144 and these warnings should be respected. Unfortunately, Morgan Stanley’s
official Code of Ethics and Business Conduct145 does not address the problem that its
multiple roles create. It also does not sufficiently recognize the existence of incentives
that could affect its employees’ independent judgment when they neither act as advisers
to state and local governments nor appreciate the ethical issues they face. The inclusion
of many provisions in the proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contract that are found, often
verbatim, in other privatization contracts and that promote the interests of private
137

Nussbaum, supra note 136; Paul Nussbaum, Pa. Turnpike Lease Plans ‘Proprietary’; Penndot Is
Keeping 48 Firms’ Plans for Running the Toll Road Secret from Legislators Even as the Governor Makes
His Pitch, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 20, 2007, at A01.
138
MORGAN STANLEY, http://www.morganstanley.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010) (listing
countries which it has advised); Offices, MAYER BROWN, http://www.mayerbrown.com/offices/index.asp
(last visited Nov. 26, 2010) (listing its worldwide offices).
139
Hamerman, supra note 119; Jerry Crimmins, Privatization Deals May Be Tougher Now; But Are Not
Dead; Lawyer Says, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 10001, Apr. 21, 2009.
140
Hamerman, supra note 119; Press Release: Morgan Stanley Closes $4.0 Billion Global Infrastructure
Fund (May 12 2008), http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/6330.html; Kelly Holman,
Infrastructure Investment Speeds Up: Morgan Stanley and Global Infrastructure Partners Are Latest To
Raise Investment Vehicles for the Space, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., May 12, 2008,
http://www.iddmagazine.com/news/181743-1.html.
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See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7–1.9, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html (concerning the Client-Lawyer Relationship).
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Longterm Lease of Turnpike Likely Best Value for Pennsylvania - Gov Rendell Seeking Law for a
Concession, TOLLROADSNEWS, May 21, 2007, http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/145.
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investors at the expense of state and local governments may themselves be evidence of a
conflict of interest. It may be that Morgan Stanley advised including noncompete
agreements and adverse action terms in the Pennsylvania contract only because it saw
them as standard contract terms. It may also have supported their inclusion because it
accurately believed that no private contractor would be interested in a deal that did not
include them.
The question remains as to the effect of such a deal on the interests of the people of
Pennsylvania. Morgan Stanley’s many roles—and especially its past and future
experience as a contractor and future role as an investor in privatization deals—may also
have predisposed it to include contract terms that would benefit investors, advisors, and
contractors, all of which it had been, was at the time, and was likely to be in the future.
The concern is not just that Morgan Stanley’s expertise might have so narrowed its vision
that it failed to consider the public interest. It is that an advisor who lacked those ties and
incentives could have taken a fresh look at the terms’ value to Pennsylvanians’ interests
and more impartially advised whether they should be included, even though the private
contractors who submitted bids insisted upon them.
The Rendell administration’s dismissal of the possibility that Morgan Stanley had
a conflict of interest seems to have been based on a very narrow understanding of what
constitutes a conflict of interest. Roy Kienitz, then deputy chief of staff for Governor
Rendell, now Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy in the Obama
Administration,146 said that Morgan Stanley would not be making any decisions with
regard to the terms of the Turnpike contract:
“They (Morgan Stanley) don’t have the power. People in this building,
the general assembly and the governor, they will set the terms.”
He said Morgan Stanley are strictly prohibited under the terms of
their employment by the state from working for any bidder and from
bidding. He said their compensation is proportional to the value of any
deal consummated to give them an incentive to work to maximize benefits
to the state. If they were paid a fixed fee they wouldn’t have that
incentive.147

¶85

The law firm of Mayer Brown was also a consultant on the Pennsylvania Turnpike
deal.148 It has also served as an adviser on other major infrastructure privatization deals
to governments (Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago Skyway, Colorado Northwest
Parkway, Indiana Toll Road, Pennsylvania Turnpike, Chicago Public Parking System)149
and to infrastructure investors, such as Macquarie, UBS Global Asset Management, and
LS Power, “on the structuring, formation, fundraising and closing of regional and global
146
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http://projects.washingtonpost.com/2009/federal-appointments/person/roy-kienitz/ (last visited Jan 26,
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Infrastructure: Experience, MAYER BROWN,
http://www.mayerbrown.com/infrastructure/index.asp?nid=11539 [hereinafter Mayer Brown Infrastructure
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infrastructure funds on behalf of both sponsors and major investors.” In addition, it has
served as counsel on infrastructure fund formation projects for major global financial
institutions.150
Mayer Brown’s advertisements as to its international experience demonstrate just
how overmatched local governments can be unless they hire advisers with similar
expertise:
Mayer Brown’s Infrastructure practice brings together teams of
lawyers in the Americas, Asia and Europe from such areas as finance and
securitization, government regulatory, corporate and securities, real estate,
tax, private equity and infrastructure funds to serve the range of client
needs in this area. Our functionality and flexibility allows us to mobilize
an experienced and integrated team wherever in the world it is needed.
Mayer Brown has worked on some of the largest and most
important infrastructure projects in the world. These include the first US
airport and first US toll road privatizations, the $5.2 billion expansion of
the Panama Canal and the award-winning Suzhou Industrial Park water
project in China. A thorough understanding of the infrastructure market
combined with our substantial track record representing clients in
landmark deals makes Mayer Brown the first-choice law firm for the
industry’s most significant players.151
We are a leading law firm in the United States for the privatization
of public assets. We regularly advise on drafting and negotiating
concession agreements with detailed capital improvement requirements
and operating standards. Clients benefit from the knowledge and
experience that we have gained from advising on projects such as the
Chicago Skyway, Indiana Toll Road, Chicago Midway Airport, Corredor
Sur Toll Road, IIRSA Sur Toll Road and Jorge Chávez International
Airport.152
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According to Mayer Brown, the lease agreement it worked on in its role as co-counsel for
the State of Indiana on the Indiana Toll Road “followed in many respects the form we
developed for the Chicago Skyway transaction” where Mayer Brown acted an adviser to
the government. 153
Revolving door relationships are not unique to the firms involved in the
Pennsylvania Turnpike. In the case of the Chicago parking meters, the city’s financial
advisers “were working on other multibillion-dollar deals with the company that emerged
as the winning bidder, Morgan Stanley. The overlapping relationships [were] in violation

150
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of the city’s own contracting rules.”154 The advisers in these cases were paid based on a
percentage of the closing value of the deal. As discussed above, this compensation
scheme may have created significant financial incentives to put closing the deal and
dollars ahead of other elements of the public interest.155
Conflicts of interest exist even among those who provide information that is
included in bids. For example, a 2006 Denver Post investigation found that only three
companies do most of the revenue projections, most of which fail to meet those
projections.156 They also have an interest in seeing the roads they assess be built or that
they are later awarded additional work on those roads.157 According to Robert Bain, an
analyst for Standard & Poor’s and expert on international toll roads, “‘[q]uite often,
people shop around until they find the people who provide the numbers.’”158 Consultants
on traffic studies have even been promised lucrative jobs or contracts if a road was
built.159
It should come as no surprise then that a 2006 Denver Post review of twenty-three
new U.S. turnpikes nationwide found that a clear majority failed to meet the revenue
projections used to justify the costs of building them. Eighty-six percent of new toll
roads in eight states “failed to meet expectations in their first full year” and by their third
year “75 percent—15 of the 20 that have been open that long—remained poor
performers.”160 When there are incentives to inflate factors underlying projections, the
figures for actual use were off by “34.5 percent to 67.5 percent of their estimated traffic
in their first year of operation” and remained dramatically off in their third year.161 In
August 2010, Australia was rocked with similar revelations that, some said, endangered
the future of public-private infrastructure.162
Unfortunately, those who are most in a position to understand these contracts have
not been fully candid in their public statements about the allocation of risk. Many of
those involved in the infrastructure privatization industry claim that most of the risk
related to the infrastructure is shifted to the investors. For example, the head of the North
American infrastructure finance and advisory business at the Royal Bank of Scotland
said, “[u]ltimately, if people don’t want to park in downtown Chicago, the risk doesn’t
accrue to the city, it accrues to the investors,” thus “[t]he investors accrue most of the risk
154
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and pay the lessor an upfront payment to assume that risk.’”163 It is interesting that
people with substantial international experience would counsel their clients to pay huge
sums of money merely to assume risk. Obviously, the money is not paid to assume risk
but, rather, to generate a return for investors. At best, that claim ignores the risk taken on
by the public along with the loss of control over vital assets paid for by public funds. At
worst, it hides the risks imposed on the public by these deals.
IV. DISCUSSION
¶91

¶92

Our decision-making processes and ways of thinking about privatization and
infrastructure are proving unequal to the complexity and long-term effects of transferring
public infrastructure to private hands. It is urgent that we change the terms of this
discussion quickly, before contracts have locked away so much of our infrastructure that
we have can no longer make critically important policy decisions outside the straitjacket
contract terms impose on our legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
We must, therefore, replace our constricted focus on “dollars and driving, public versus
private” with appropriate substantive and procedural principles and processes in order to
achieve our articulated goals.164
Issues that have emerged as important to this discussion include (1) protecting the
public welfare; (2) ensuring value for money; (3) taking all contingencies into account;
(4) establishing principles to justify the inclusion of each contract term; (5) demonstrating
the superiority of privatization over public provision; and (6) establishing a process that
ensures all relevant information is presented and properly evaluated. Each of these
principles is easy to articulate and should have broad—but not unanimous—support. The
difficulty will be in unpacking their content and identifying the contentious issues each
presents. Achieving those goals requires a participatory and open-ended process, one that
extends into the future. What can be done here is to lay the groundwork by briefly
articulating issues related to each of these principles, examining pending proposals
concerning infrastructure privatization, and, finally, considering whether those proposals
provide a satisfactory way to deal with the complex issues that lie at the intersection of
public and private provision of infrastructure.
A. New Terms for Decisions on Infrastructure Provision
1. Protecting the Public Welfare

¶93

The GAO has warned that the public interest is likely to be overlooked when
infrastructure privatization processes fail to formally include the public in the decisionmaking process.165 If there is any issue not captured by our impoverished “dollars and
163
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driving, public versus private” discussion on infrastructure, it is certainly the public
welfare. Public welfare involves far more than a contract’s financial terms, although
money certainly matters. A focus on the public welfare raises questions such as what
happens when citizens “go from being taxpayers using public facilities to customers of a
for-profit business”?166 Even though that articulation of the issue is more limited than
one shaped by a focus on the public welfare, it is far broader than the current constrained
discussion.
We cannot broaden our analyses until we identify all elements of the public
interest and welfare, and not just smooth roadbeds and uncongested roads that get people
from point A to B rapidly. Achieving such a system must provide efficient travel at low
financial cost for the greatest number of people. It must also promote clean air and other
environmental and health issues. In addition, it needs to do more than merely take into
account and anticipate changes in housing patterns, urban density, business locations, and
growth; it must promote healthier patterns for going about our daily activities.
A road is of little use if it is not part of a system. Indeed, centuries ago this
country moved from having a haphazard assemblage of private roads to our current
integrated system of roads, because we were a people with important destinations. We
are now a people who need a system that includes more than just roads. To be of any
value, the discussion about that system must include all forms of transportation, its
location, and what it carries, rather than being limited to just roads, a single road, or even
a few miles of a road. While the discussion must have national scope because all
transportation decisions have national effects, it must also protect local interests and
needs.
Officers of private companies have fiduciary obligations to act on behalf of
shareholders by generating profits. If we are to protect the public interest, we need
someone charged with fiduciary obligations to the public. Those public protections
might be modeled on those of a company’s investors, including disclosure of information
sufficient to make an informed decision. To be effective that means highlighting risks of
complex financial instruments, fee structures, and potential conflicts of interests.167 That
body must also be charged with resolving the dilemma created by extant—and, most
likely, future—infrastructure privatization contracts that protect expected revenues by
imposing extra costs on the public.
2. Ensuring Value for Money

¶97

Protecting the public welfare does not mean excluding economic considerations or
the importance of getting value from our assets. One irony of the limited financial focus
of current infrastructure privatization analyses is that it can—and has—led to greater
collective costs while also overlooking what we truly value. In economic terms,
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0844.pdf. The City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General also
released a report that explored this issue. CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 8,
at 33.
166
Chandler, supra note 83.
167
AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER 134, INFRASTRUCTURE ENTITIES: IMPROVING
DISCLOSURE FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 5–6 (2010), available at
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/cp134.pdf/$file/cp134.pdf.

83

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

¶98

¶99

[2011

privatized infrastructure makes money through negative externalities, that is, by allowing
private contractors to impose costs elsewhere. Those negative externalities can only be
identified and avoided by engaging in an extensive discussion about what we mean by
“value” and even what is defined as valued. Not all things of value can be easily
expressed in monetary terms, making it difficult to ensure they are taken into account.
This problem must be addressed.
It should be obvious that unless we identify actual costs and benefits we cannot
engage in a cost-benefit analysis; however, governments across the United States are
considering whether to sign multi-decade infrastructure privatization contracts without
taking either of these necessary steps. As long as state and local governments’ “decisions
regarding PPPs are principally based on financial analyses, such as asset valuation,” they
miss larger costs.168 Worse than just failing to identify all costs and benefits, key contract
terms have been kept from the public—and not explained—even though it is the public
who will be bound by those contractual obligations. If we are to protect the public
interest, contracts must be structured so that benefits to the public are commensurate with
the length of the contract. Only in this way can we ensure that “upfront” money is not
“burned through” within the first years of a lease.169
Questions are already being asked about the factors driving governments to enter
into contracts that tend to range from fifty to ninety-nine years:
State Senator Jeffrey Schoenberg (D-Evanston), who has studied the
proposed privatization of the Illinois Tollway, believes public officials are
being outnegotiated and leasing too cheap.
Ninety-nine years is too long for a public asset to be leased,
Schoenberg argues, because no one can see that far into the future. Few
leases in Europe, for instance, run more than forty years. He also thinks
there should be formulas that allow taxpayers to benefit from the upside if
deals pay off more handsomely than expected. Spain and others have
insisted on such clauses in some of their asset leases.
In the Skyway deal, investors “covered their investment in a few
years,” Schoenberg said. “Therefore, everything else was gravy.”170

¶100

Certainly, the public needs to know about the existence of and cost to the public of
tax breaks to private contractors, contractors’ ability to issue tax-free bonds, and the
effects of using of tax-free bonds compared with funding from other sources, including
understanding how the resulting loss of tax revenue exacerbates the financial woes that
make privatization attractive. As part of a comprehensive analysis, we need to examine
whether the loss of tax revenue to federal, state, or local budgets caused by tax breaks
given to infrastructure privatization investors is a net cost or benefit, because, for
example, it attracts private investment. That inquiry must also include a comparison with

168
David W. Gaffey, Outsourcing Infrastructure: Expanding the Use of Public-Private Partnerships in the
United States, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 356 n.28, 359–60 (2010).
169
Nathan Hellman, Chicago Burning Through Privatization Cash: Think Tank Director Points to
Indiana’s Use of Toll Road Cash as a Better Model, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE NWI.COM, Mar. 1, 2010,
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/illinois/0a7f7fef-102b-5ef0-bf76-c0fb5c46e654.html.
170
Chandler, supra note 83.
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the costs and benefits of using public bonds to fund construction and improvements.171
We need to ask whether it is certain that contractors will refuse to enter into these deals
without tax breaks, noncompete agreements, and the like. If tax breaks are a deal
breaker, it means that the contractors have concluded that they cannot make a sufficient
return on their investments without tax breaks. If that is the case, the information
suggests that the private sector is not delivering a superior product through better
organization or smarter work processes.
3. Taking all Contingencies into Account
¶101

Entering into a multi-decade relationship, especially one that is expensive to exit
and affects the public interest, requires being a pessimist. Infrastructure privatization
deals are vetted by experts who are narrowly focused on making deals happen. People
with that point of view—and especially those whose job and pay depend on getting a deal
done—have an incentive to be optimistic and to reach a specific result. They lack the
necessary pessimism and objectivity required to identify problems. Relationships created
by infrastructure contracts involve parties whose interests are not fully aligned. They
also have the potential to co-opt public officials. These and other negative outcomes and
their effects must be identified and taken seriously while a deal is being considered. The
contracts must be examined to ensure that, throughout the contract term, the parties do
not undermine one another. The current recession has demonstrated the need to take into
account the potential effects of severe economic downturns and disruption, rather than
assuming normal to booming economic conditions. For example:
PPPs are vulnerable to both the financial and the real impact of the crisis.
Although the final consequences and duration of the crisis are not yet
known, the likely effects on PPPs can already be identified. Both existing
and planned (hereafter pipeline) PPP programs could be affected through
various channels, such as the availability and cost of credit, lower growth,
and unforeseen exchange rate movements. Depending on the contractual
arrangement between the parties, the changed distribution of risks can
shift the cost burden between the parties, weakening the attractiveness of
PPPs.172

¶102

At the least, there must not be incentives for analyses to reach a specific result, nor
disincentives to giving honest, negative assessments.173

171

An article by Susan Chandler identifies a number of issues related to infrastructure privatization. See
Chandler, supra note 83. These should be part of the process advocated here.
172
Philippe Burger, et al., The Effects of the Financial Crisis on Public-Private Partnerships 3 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/09/144, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09144.pdf.
173
For example, Pittsburgh “hired global management firm Morgan Stanley to assist in the effort [to lease
its parking garages]. Morgan Stanley will be paid $3 million from the proceeds of the deal should one be
reached.” Brandolph, supra note 131 (emphasis added).
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4. Justifying the Inclusion of Each Term in the Contract
¶103

Form contracts and the inclusion of standardized clauses in contracts may appear
to be a useful way of not reinventing the wheel; however, contract law scholars have
identified many concerns about their use, including allowing a sophisticated party to take
advantage of an inexperienced party.174 In addition to the sorts of problematic clauses
discussed throughout this Article,175 it is important to consider the extent to which a
contract eliminates accountability mechanisms, including market accountability, and thus
is devoid of incentives to modernize and improve.
¶104
It is worth considering whether advisers and others, in an abundance of caution,
are simply reusing contracts that have so far created no problems without analyzing
whether they fit new situations. We know that noncompetition, adverse action, and other
provisions are included so that the private contractor can make as much money as
possible from the deal, but we do not know whether these deals undermine our
commitment to competition and freedom of the market. We also do not know whether
very long contract terms eliminate the market discipline that would exist if the state could
take its business elsewhere when a contractor’s performance is poor.
5. Demonstrating the Superiority of Private over Public Provision
¶105

Although the process generally used to decide whether to lease public
infrastructure to a private contractor has been negotiation, there are several reasons why
negotiation is not an appropriate way to decide whether to privatize infrastructure. First,
as discussed earlier, the process of negotiation has focused narrowly on dollars and the
details of maintaining and improving the infrastructure.176 As a result, public interest
issues of autonomy and control have been neglected. This is the case even though public
officials who participate in the negotiations or decision are charged with representing the
public interest.
¶106
Second, decisions as to whether infrastructure should be privatized depend on
accurately predicting complex events stretching into the distant future. Even basic issues,
such as predicting levels of traffic, modes of transportation, and the value of money fifty
to ninety-nine years from now present challenges beyond the capacity of principled
negotiation. When the foundational premises for making decisions are this imperfect and
when obligations are frozen for half a century or more, the effects of imperfections are
likely to be magnified. Worse, when the foundations for the contract are fundamentally
flawed, even the most rational and principled process of negotiation cannot repair the
situation.
¶107
If these problems are to be addressed, ascertaining the accuracy of the data relied
on is of critical importance. Fortunately, we do have long experience with a process that
has operated reasonably well to ascertain the truth in complex, contested situations: trials.
It is helpful, then, to consider whether mechanisms used as part of the fact-finding

174

David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-form Contracts: Strategic
Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 983 (2006) (presenting and critiquing concern connected to the use of boilerplate).
175
See supra Part III.
176
See supra Part I.
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process in trials could play a useful role in making decisions about infrastructure
privatization.
¶108
In trials in our common law system, the focus is on determining as accurately as
possible what happened.177 Decisions about privatizing infrastructure need to be focused
on determining as accurately as possible what will happen. In both cases, it is necessary
that an assertion be properly established by evidence before it is accepted.178 The legal
system has developed methods for resolving issues related to future conduct, most
commonly seen with injunctions.179 Injunctions are part of a system known as equity, a
superstructure built on the common law system, and is not discussed as a model here,
though it may provide useful insights into issues related to privatization.
¶109
Under the common law, juries and judges regularly make decisions based on their
assessment of the credibility of evidence presented to them.180 They are assisted in that
process by a system that depends on adversaries challenging the evidence presented in
order to show its flaws, a subject discussed in the next section.181 One feature that assists
the factfinder is the burden of proof. When the factfinder concludes that evidence for and
against a result is of equal merit, the party with the burden of proof loses.182 The
placement of burdens of proof—in particular two of its components, the burdens of
production of evidence and persuasion of the factfinder—have long been found to be a
useful truth-seeking mechanism. As Professor Martinez explains:
The burden of proof thus provides the parties to a controversy the
necessary structure and guidance to pursue a claim. This responsibility of
proof may well act to impose a very real risk of loss on a particular party.
Indeed, a certain amount of risk-bearing and risk-shifting may be
reasonably required of any moderately sophisticated and efficient dispute
resolution system. 183
Thus, all parties to a controversy are likely to find that burdens provide them with
structure and guidance in pursuing and deciding the merits of a claim.
¶110
Two rationales for assigning burdens of production and persuasion to a party are
especially relevant here: burdens of proof are assigned to the party that (1) alleges the
least likely scenario and (2) has the best knowledge about a matter at issue or the easiest
177

See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 494–99 (3d. ed. 1999).
See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 732, 764 n.132 (1984) (discussing the similarity between civil procedure and the scientific method in
determining what “really” occurred).
179
See FLEMING JAMES, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 31 (5th ed. 2001).
180
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s 1966 study, The American Jury, found that trial judges in the criminal
cases studied agreed with juries in at least a quarter of the cases. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). A more recent effort to replicate that study found similar results. Theodore
Eisenberg, et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s
The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).
181
See infra Part IV.A.6.
182
See JAMES supra note 179, at 414–23.
183
Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 246 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer
Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 219 (1953) (identifying several reasons for the existence of
presumptions); J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 261 (1944)
(discussing a sample jury instruction for a finding by the preponderance of evidence).
178
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access to evidence.184 The two burdens work together and are conceptually linked. “[A]
decision as to whether a party has satisfied the production burden cannot be made without
considering the degree of certainty required to meet the persuasion burden.”185
¶111
In making decisions about infrastructure privatization, it is proponents of
privatization who allege the least likely scenario: that public infrastructure is better
provided by private parties. That conclusion is based on the United States’ history and
experience of many services and goods having been first provided by private entities and
then moved into the public sector as a result of problems with private provision.186 It is
therefore useful to respect the meaning of that placement in deciding whether to change
the provision of infrastructure from the public to the private sector. The burden of
persuasion should, therefore, be assigned to the party asserting that specific infrastructure
should be privatized.187
¶112
As discussed earlier, it is the proponents of privatization who have particular
knowledge about the matters at issue or who have the easiest access to that
information.188 Therefore, the burden of production of evidence should be placed on
them. An additional reason for that placement of the burdens of production and
persuasion is to account for (1) costs associated with the disruption associated with
change and (2) the problem of identifying and accurately valuing all costs. It is prudent,
for both these reasons, to require that there have been an honest and complete
examination of the existing situation compared with the proposed alternative and whether
the status quo can be improved by less drastic changes.189
¶113
The evidence to be presented and examined will generally include identifying the
basic responsibilities in terms of services and how they are provided. Whether services
or functions are currently delivered in an efficient cost-effective fashion must be
considered, and if they are not delivered in a cost-effective manner, evidence must be
presented as to how their performance could be improved with or without privatization.
To those factors should be added the record of analogous contracting situations with full
explanations for differences in performance between the public sector and private
contractors, if such differences exist. The decision-making process should also take into
account hidden or external costs associated with privatization to avoid contracting out
when it does not actually provide superior outcomes.190 That includes examining ways to
184

Martinez, supra note 183, at 252–54.
Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 178, at 764 n.131.
186
See Moshe Adler, The Origins of Governmental Production: Cleaning the Streets of New York By
Contract During the 19th Century, available at
http://archive.epinet.org/real_media/010111/materials/adler.pdf; see also Ellen Dannin, To Market, To
Market: Caveat Emptor, TO MARKET, TO MARKET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS 8–10 (Sheila S. Kennedy
et al. eds., 2000).
187
See ROBERT GINSBURG & KEN BLUM, THE MIDWEST CENTER FOR LABOR RESEARCH, ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED PRIVATIZATION OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF STREETS AND SANITATION (DSS) ABANDONED
CAR TOWING SERVICES 3–4 (1997), available at http://inthepublicinterest.org/article/analysis-proposedprivatization-chicago-department-streets-and-sanitation-dss (follow “Towing Privatization study 1997.pdf”
hyperlink).
188
See supra Part III.C.
189
See Ellen Dannin, Counting What Matters: Privatization, People with Disabilities, and the Cost of LowWage Work, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1348 (2008), for a discussion of costs commonly overlooked and, therefore,
omitted from a privatization analysis.
190
Some laws have required that a margin of savings be demonstrated. Dannin, supra note 186, at 22.
185
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enhance existing management and operations and considering whether the analysis has
taken into account that governmental responsibility cannot be limited to delivering
services only when they are “profitable.”
6. Establishing a Process that Ensures All Relevant Information is Presented and
Properly Evaluated
¶114

It is at this point that the process most often breaks down. First, in the case of
privatization—in all its forms—all costs are not identified and, therefore, that information
cannot be considered in assessing bids. A common example is including the costs of
oversight to ensure the private contractor provides the services it agreed to. If costs are
not even identified as costs, they obviously cannot be included. In some cases no efforts
are made to identify costs, and, in the case of oversight costs, their various forms may be
distributed among many parts of government191 and, thus, difficult to identify.
¶115
Second, it is not enough to provide figures to decision makers if they lack the
ability to understand them and their significance. Therefore, what is needed is an expert
body to evaluate the content of bids192 and the conclusions to be drawn about them. 193
That expert oversight body must also assist officials in understanding the information
provided.194 Similar challenges exist in trials. One solution has been to use testimony by
experts to help a jury understand how to evaluate the evidence.195 Other options include
using blue ribbon juries whose jurors have higher than normal education196 or skills than
the general population or assign fact-finding to special masters.197
¶116
Third, the thorny problems that exist in deciding whether to privatize do not end
when a contract is awarded. Compliance with the terms must be ensured throughout the
contract. In testimony before the General Accounting Office, Moshe Adler described
provisions advocated by privatization proponents in order to ensure accountability and
best value:
Economists today believe that the necessary and sufficient measures for
making contracting out competitive are:
i. Use competitive bidding;
ii. Divide the service area into different districts;

The federal government has required that a private-sector bid must demonstrate that privatizing a
governmental function will result in “costs savings of 10 percent of personnel-related costs or $10 million,
whichever is less, before awarding the private sector an activity with more than 10 FTEs.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-434R, IMPLEMENTATION OF OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76 AT SCIENCE
AGENCIES 14 ( 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07434r.pdf.
191
Dannin, supra note 186, at 15–30, 45–47.
192
See Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2128, 2131–32 (1989) (discussing whether sausage made from sawdust and rat parts is still sausage
because it has come through the sausage machine and whatever comes out of that machine is, by definition,
sausage).
193
Dannin, supra note 186, at 40–44.
194
Id. at 46–47.
195
EDWARD W. CLEARY, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 33–45 (3d. ed 1984).
196
Editorial Board, The “Blue Ribbon” Jury, 60 HARV. L. REV. 613 (1947) (providing a history of the use
of blue-ribbon juries).
197
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
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iii. The city should perform the service in one of the districts in order to
maintain its capacity to replace a delinquent contractor;
iv. Require performance bonds;
v. Use short contract periods;
vi. Contracts should not be renewed without new competitive bids.198
¶117

In addition, it is argued that the fear of losing a contract to another bidder at the
end of the contract term creates competition and market discipline.199 Whether that is
true or not, the multi-generational length of infrastructure contracts effectively removes
the lash of nonrenewal after a contract expires. The only option governments have to
enforce accountability is strong, ongoing oversight. However, although contracts permit
oversight, as discussed earlier, private contractors’ right to claim compensation on the
grounds that the oversight improperly interfered with the flow of traffic means the right is
somewhat constrained.200
¶118
However effective those solutions seem, it is unlikely they can be applied in the
case of infrastructure privatization. One could ask for traffic predictions, and the industry
would do a masterful job of producing a persuasive document with figures to support
their contentions. However, as with all figures produced by those who are self-interested,
their recommendations and reports are not likely to emerge from a process of selfcriticism.
¶119
Experience with toll road revenue projections are a good example of the problem.
Revenue projections are an important factor in contract prices and, potentially, claims for
revenues lost as a result of adverse actions. It is, therefore, important that those
projections be as accurate as possible, despite being based on estimates about future
transportation patterns, the cost of money, the economy, and incentives by others to take
198

Moshe Adler, Why Do We Have Government Employees?, Senior Economist, Fiscal Policy Inst. &
Adjunct Professor, Columbia Univ., Dep’t of Urban Planning, Prepared Statement for General Accounting
Office Commercial Activities Panel (June 11, 2001); see Moshe Adler, Been There, Done That! The
Privatization of Street Cleaning In Nineteenth Century New York, NEW LAB. F. 88, 90–81 (Spring/Summer
1999) (providing more details on managed competition). However, close examination of the details of the
operation of contemporary privatization and managed competition provides a more complex picture that
undermines the view of privatization advocates. See Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Pragmatism Over
Politics: Alternative Service Delivery in Local Government, 1992–2002, 71 THE MUN. Y.B. 8, 14 (2004).;
Roland Zullo, Confronting the Wicked Witch and Exposing the Wizard Public-Sector Unions and
Privatization Policy, 6 J. OF LAB. & SOC’Y 9 (2002); Roland Zullo, In Search of the Silver Lining: The
Privatization of Welfare-to-Work Services in San Diego County (June 21, 200) (unpublished paper) (on file
with author).
199
Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 83, 129 (2003) (“Shorter contracts create higher transaction costs, but foster healthy competition and
accountability, as private contractors know their contract is up for renewal before long.”); see also Edward
Rubin, Book Review: The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 898
(2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds. 2009) ) (“[T]here is also a serious constraint on the effectiveness of
subsequent monitoring because the government cannot afford to terminate the contract.”); Jon D. Michaels,
Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 743–44 (2010) (“[T]ermination clauses raise the price
of the contract, particularly with respect to contracts for complex services . . . that require substantial initial
investments of resources, training, and capital outlays . . . [and] may undermine any chance of cost savings
to the government.”).
200
See supra Part II.A.
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actions adverse to the parties’ interests.201 At the same time, those who are charged with
making a decision on behalf of the public lack the capacity to evaluate the evidence
presented on traffic predictions and revenue projections. They must, therefore, rely on
industry insiders to provide an honestly critical evaluation.
¶120
Even imposing high burdens of proof or presumptions against privatization cannot
overcome these problems. There must be a body with the expertise to assess data and
conclusions. What is needed is something like the Congressional Budget Office,202 that
is, a body staffed with people who have the legal responsibility to critically analyze
information plus knowledge and skills that at least match those who are providing expert
information concerning privatization.
¶121
Other countries have taken that approach and have developed special governmental
bodies charged with the obligation to oversee privatization. Spain, for example,
requires the Ministry of Public Works to assign public engineers to
oversee performance of PPP projects both during construction and
throughout operation. These monitors catalog incidents of noncompliance
with the terms of the contract by the private contractor and review and
catalog user complaints in an effort to ensure the reliability of the
infrastructure and conformance with the concession terms.203
The United Kingdom has created a number of permanent governmental and quasigovernmental bodies to handle issues related to privatization. The private finance
initiative (PFI) was created in 1992, and, more recently, Partnerships UK, the National
Audit Office (NAO), the Public Accounts Committee, and the Audit Commission have
been charged with addressing needs not met by the PFI.204 Other agencies include
Infrastructure UK (IUK),205 the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
(CPNI),206 and the Infrastructure Planning Commission.207
201

Judy MacInnes, Cintra’s August Traffic Falls on Main Concessions, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2008, available
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/rbssIndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUKLB70560420080911 (noting that
the economic downturn has decreed the amount of traffic on the Indiana toll road).
202
See Fact Sheet, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factsheet.cfm.
203
Gaffey, supra note 168, at 363 (footnotes omitted).
204
Id. at 361–62.
205
Infrastructure UK, HM TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ppp_infrastructureuk.htm. It
“advises government on the long-term infrastructure needs of the UK and provides commercial expertise to
support major projects and programmes.” Id. (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
206
CENTRE FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010). The CPNI is the “government authority that provides protective security advice to the
national infrastructure.” Id.
207
Our Role, INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING COMMISSION, http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/who-weare/our-role/.
The IPC is an independent body.
INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING COMMISSION,
http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). It decides “applications for nationally
significant infrastructure projects. These are the large projects that support the economy and vital public
services, including railways, large wind farms, power stations, reservoirs, harbours, airports and sewage
treatment works.” Id. After the 2010 elections, the new coalition government announced plans to abolish
the IPC, and place its functions elsewhere. Infrastructure Planning Commission: Planning Reform
Following
the
2010
General
Election,
CAMPAIGN
TO
PROTECT
RURAL
ENG.,
http://www.planninghelp.org.uk/planning-system/planning-for-major-infrastructure-projects/majorinfrastructure-the-infrastructure-planning-commission. The Government must legislate to abolish the IPC,
which it is expected to do in the Decentralisation and Localism Bill due to receive its first reading in
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In addition, the UK Treasury issues standardized contract terms accompanied by
explanations as to their significance. According to the Treasury:
Sec.1.2.1. The three main objectives of the guidance remain unchanged.
First, to promote a common understanding of the main risks which are
encountered in a standard PFI project; secondly, to allow consistency of
approach and pricing across a range of similar projects; and thirdly, to
reduce the time and costs of negotiation by enabling all parties concerned
to agree a range of areas that can follow a standard approach without
extended negotiations.208

¶123

In addition to providing these structures and guidance, infrastructure privatization
contracts, particularly in Europe, tend to be far shorter than those in the United States.
Shorter contracts lessen a whole host of problems, including accuracy of predictions,
impingement on democratic processes, and locked-in, obsolescent infrastructure.
B. A Way Forward

¶124

In the United States, we are a long way from having a system akin to that which
regulates infrastructure privatization in the United Kingdom. Making wise decisions on
infrastructure require more than creating an expert decision-making body. Better
decisions are most likely to emerge when the public has at least basic knowledge about
the terms on which public infrastructure is provided and the effects of the options offered.
However, gaining access to information held by private companies, along with other
accountability obligations imposed on private actors, present special challenges.209
Accountability obligations might be imposed on private infrastructure contractors by
contract, as long as the contractors were willing to agree to those terms. Legislation
might also be enacted to prohibit state and local governments from entering into any
contract that does not include public accountability. That legislation could apply at least
to components of our interstate highway system or even to all infrastructure built with
federal money and that is part of our interstate transportation system. The specific
policies for that legislation can be found in the formal name of our interstate system: the
Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. That name
recognizes the relationship of our system of highways to the public interest.
¶125
We currently have a model for, at least, ensuring that important information,
relevant to infrastructure privatization, is provided through language proposed in the
111th Congress’ House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s bill, The

Parliament in November 2010. Id. The Government intends to replace the IPC with a Major Infrastructure
Planning Unit that would be part of the Planning Inspectorate. Id. This Unit would carry out broadly the
same functions as the IPC, but final decisions would be made by Ministers based on the recommendations
of the Unit. Id.; Planning Act Blog 185: First Hint Of Localism Bill Contents In Regional Strategy
Judgment, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Nov. 11, 2010. However, as of this writing, those anticipated
changes have not yet taken place.
208
HM TREASURY, STANDARDISATION OF PFI CONTRACTS, Version 4 1 (2007), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pfi_sopc4pu101_210307.pdf.
209
See Dannin, supra note 60, for more discussion on these special challenges and related issues.
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Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009210 and the Committee’s accompanying
document, The Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009: A Blueprint for
Investment and Reform. That bill emphasizes disclosure, fair process, and attention to the
public interest in relation to PPP agreements, and the Blueprint succinctly explains the
bill’s goals.211
¶126
In addition to new procedures and substantive obligations, the bill proposes
creating a new public body charged with implementing new rights and thus potentially
moving the United States closer to models found in Europe. The bill itself is infused with
decades of experience under the Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, if enacted, these
provisions should promote democratic values and build on experience with how complex
decisions can be fairly, effectively, and wisely made. The bill recognizes the current
system’s benefits, such as generating revenues to support transportation projects that
might otherwise not be financially viable and problems, such as imposing costs on those
least able to pay.212 It concludes that in order to “protect the integrity of the nation’s
surface transportation system and the public interest regarding trade and travel, the
Federal surface transportation program requires strengthened public protections regarding
highway toll projects and PPP agreements.”213 The bill follows up on these findings by
including both substantive and procedural protections and positive and negative
obligations to deal with common problems that have arisen under current infrastructure
privatization agreements, several of which are discussed in the next sections.
1. New Substantive Rights
¶127

The bill tackles some of the contract terms that have received the strongest
criticism. It prohibits noncompete agreements by barring any state or local public
authority from entering into an agreement with a private person “under which the State is
prevented from improving or expanding the capacity of public roads in the same travel
corridor.”214 Those prohibitions are also included in the section of the bill that creates the
Office of Public Benefit.215
¶128
In addition to prohibiting noncompetition agreements and other anticompetitive
provisions, the bill mandates that certain terms be included in public-private partnership
agreements. Terms that must be included are those (1) that prohibit closing all or part of
the highway to vehicular traffic, except “for routine and capital maintenance or accident
210

STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 (Comm. Print 2009). The Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009
has not been enacted.
211
STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12.
212
Id. at 31.
213
Id.
214
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1301(a). Section 1301(a) would amend § 129(a)(3). Id. In addition, if the
bill were enacted § 1504 Public-Private Partnership Agreements would add § (h) Public-Private
Partnership Agreements and provide in § 112(h)(3)(B): The contract “does not include any provision under
which the State is prevented from improving or expanding the capacity of public roads in the same travel
corridor as the highway facility.” Id. § 1204.
215
Section 1204 establishes an Office of Public Benefit. Id. § 1204. Its duties include vetting the terms of
public-private agreements. Id. Among the terms it must include ensuring that a PPP agreement “does not
include any provision under which the State is prevented from improving or expanding the capacity of
public roads in the same travel corridor as the highway facility.” Id.
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clearance”; (2) that give the state or local public authority the right “to enter and take
control of the highway facility and reopen it for operation in cases in which the private
partner closes the highway facility in violation” of these provisions; (3) that, in the case
of evacuations required during a state of emergency involving a major disaster as defined
by law, the highway facility must be open and no tolls charged during the evacuation; (4)
that the state or local public authority may reclaim ownership of the highway facility
during the contract term and must “provide fair market value compensation to the private
partner”; and (5) that, when the contract is returned to the public authority at the end of
the contract, the road must be or be brought up to “an appropriate state of repair, given its
life expectancy.”216 Finally, contractors are not allowed to compete by underpaying
workers.217 They must pay construction workers “wages at rates not less than those
prevailing on projects of a character similar in the locality.”218
¶129
In short, these new substantive provisions, if enacted, would address strong and
persistent criticisms of infrastructure privatization.
2. New Procedural Rights
¶130

The bill includes new procedural rights designed to bring enhanced information
into the decision-making process. In some cases infrastructure has been privatized
without providing information to the public, public notice of terms, and an opportunity
for public comment, or only minimal time has been provided.219
¶131
First, the bill mandates that, before the Secretary of Transportation can approve
any contract that involves a public-private partnership agreement, the state or local public
authority must engage in a “value-for-money assessment” as to whether “a public-private
partnership agreement, as proposed for the potential project, would provide value
compared with traditional public delivery methods.” That assessment must examine (1)
the “potential life-cycle cost and delivery timeframe of the project under traditional
public delivery methods as compared to under the approach proposed by the private
partner”; (2) benefits or costs associated with any transfer of risk to the private partner
under the public-private partnership agreement; and (3) other quantitative and qualitative
benefits or costs associated with public delivery of the project.220 While these are
important steps, their efficacy depends upon cash-strapped state and local governments
employing people whose interests are not aligned with those of the privatization industry
and, yet, have the ability to make those assessments. It may be that only the federal
government has the resources to provide that unbiased oversight.
¶132
Second, the state or local public authority must make key terms of any proposed
public-private partnership agreement available to the public. The bill also addresses
contractor concerns by excluding from disclosure “any information in a project proposal
216

Id. § 1504.
See id. § 1505.
218
Id.
219
See, e.g., Letter from City of Golden to Chairman & Transp. Comm’rs, Transp. Comm’n of Colo., supra
note 65, at 2–3 (noting that three days notice provided and incomplete information given); CHICAGO
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that two days notice was given to the
Chicago City Council).
220
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1504 (Comm. Print 2009).
217
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that is, in the judgment of the public authority, confidential or proprietary.”221 Again, this
is a valuable proposal but one that is likely to flounder when it meets strong opposition to
disclosure and claims that most contractor information is confidential or proprietary.
¶133
Third, the state or local public authority must “offer interested parties a reasonable
opportunity to comment on the proposed agreement.”222 In order to make the right to
comment useful, the bill provides that “the public authority shall, to the maximum extent
practicable” hold “public meetings at convenient and accessible locations and times” and
provide relevant information “in electronically accessible format and means, such as the
World Wide Web[.]”223 To make these disclosures and comment rights meaningful, they
must be preceded and accompanied by a widely disseminated educational program that
addresses the broad gaps in knowledge that now exist.
3. A New Public Rights Protector
¶134

Finally, the draft Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009 does not leave
monitoring and contesting actions solely in private hands. Rather, it establishes an
“Office of Public Benefit” as part of the Federal Highway Administration and charges it
with providing “for the protection of the public interest in relation to highway toll
projects and public-private partnership agreements on Federal-aid highways.” 224 The
Office of Public Benefit would be responsible for monitoring and reporting to the
Secretary of Transportation, in order to ensure that public authorities meet their legal
obligations and to protect the public’s rights set out in the bill.225
¶135
Under the Act, the Director of the Office of Public Benefit must review and
approve or disapprove proposed toll rate schedules and monitor restrictions on use of toll
revenues and prohibitions on noncompete agreements.226 The Director must fully protect
the public’s right to comment on toll rate schedules and must ameliorate the effects of
tolls on interstate commerce or travel, with special consideration taken for low-income
travelers.227 Finally, the Director must assess whether a proposed public-private
partnership agreement “provides value compared with traditional public delivery
methods; make[s] available to the public key terms of the contract to be awarded; and
offer[s] interested parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed
agreement.”228
¶136
These three categories of new rights and obligations represent a sea change from
recent policy. Only a few years ago, the U.S. Department of Transportation urged states
to enact legislation that included, among other things, the power to establish geographic
noncompetion zones in order for states to undertake public-private investment

221

Id.
Id.
223
Id. § 1504.
224
Id. § 1204.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 31–32.
228
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 1504 (Comm. Print 2009).
222
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initiatives.229 Recent experiences and public reactions have increased support for
outlawing noncompete agreements.230
4. The Bill’s Future
¶137

There is much to like about this bill and its efforts on behalf of investment and
reform of our national transportation system. It provides a serious approach to many
problems connected with surface transportation, including environmental issues and the
need to develop alternative forms of transportation.231 Unfortunately, it was not taken up
in the last Congress, apparently caught up in the need to focus on other issues, such as the
economic recovery, financial reform, and health care. Its current prospects seem dismal.
¶138
While delay in such an important area is frustrating, it may provide an opportunity
to rethink issues. Among other things, the passage of time may make it possible for
Congress to consider the novel ideas and perspectives presented in the discussion in Part
III.A.
V. TAXING QUESTIONS
¶139

Although the proposed Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009 would
address important problems, the nation’s mood, the economy, and the balance of power
in Washington after the 2010 elections mean it is unlikely to become law. As a result,
long-pending problems will remain unaddressed. Yet, it is worth noting that the genesis
of our interstate highway system was more than seventy years ago during the Great
Depression. In February 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the U.S. Bureau of
Public Roads (BPR) for a feasibility study of a system of transcontinental highways.232
Congress followed up with two reports: Toll Roads and Free Roads (1939) and
Interregional Highways (1944).233 The reports recommended “a ‘system of direct
interregional highways, with all necessary connections through and around cities,
designed to meet the requirements of the national defense in time of war and the needs of
a growing peacetime traffic of longer range.’”234
¶140
It is difficult to call to mind the optimism that our forebears had while in the midst
of terrible economic troubles and fighting a war in Europe and the Pacific. When the
interstate highway system was in its infancy, this was an optimistic country that relished
challenges and took on the responsibilities citizens owe their countries and their
compatriots. Perhaps those days will never come again. For decades, we have shirked
our responsibilities. Indeed, government investment in non-defense infrastructure as a
percentage of GDP has declined by more than 40% since 1960, while the U.S. population

229

DOT REPORT, supra note 61.
See infra Part II.B, for a discussion on recent experiences with noncompetition agreements.
231
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 111TH CONG., SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 § 701.
232
Richard F. Weingroff, Essential to the National Interest, 69 PUBLIC ROADS, Mar./April 2006, at 2,
available at http://www.ibrc.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/06mar/07.cfm.
233
Id.
234
Id.
230
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has grown by 66%.235 We are now a country that sells off its assets rather than face up to
challenges and responsibilities. But debt and decline are not inevitable, and we can make
other, better choices. For example, we can tap sources of revenue that would actually
create a fairer tax system. Changes to income tax law since 1995 have let the wealthiest
among us pay a decreasing percentage of their income as taxes. As a result, in 2007, the
most recent year for which we have information, the top 400 tax filers paid on average
$46 million less in taxes than if they were taxed at 1995 rates.236 Payments into Social
Security stop once a person’s income reaches $106,800.237 The result is a regressive tax
that falls more heavily on those who earn least while also generating less money to fund
public needs.
¶141
Declining tax rates on top earners has had a profound effect on tax revenues. The
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that, had the top-earning 400
households paid taxes at the rates in effect before those tax cuts, the federal government
would have collected an additional $18 billion each year.238 Greater tax revenues could
then be used to restore our infrastructure, as well as fund other important priorities. In
other words, our only option is not selling off our assets on terms that cede to private
hands control of our democratic institutions, autonomy, and destiny.
¶142
The federal gas tax, which funds our transportation infrastructure, suffers from
similar problems. It no longer meets our needs because (1) the increased use of fuel
efficient vehicles has driven down fuel tax revenues per mile driven; (2) the tax, long
stuck at 18.4 cents per gallon, is not indexed for inflation and has not been raised for over
a decade;239 and (3) there is no political will to take the obvious step of setting the fuel
tax at a level sufficient to maintain and build our country’s infrastructure. Instead, the
federal government has met the revenue shortfall by taking money from other funds.240
Thus, “what drivers may not see or understand is that even though higher fuel prices
mean that they are paying a higher price for driving that does not mean that they
contribute more towards the cost of roads.”241 These funding problems and other
challenges have kept surface transportation programs on the GAO’s High-Risk list.242
235

Tax and Financing Aspects of Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy, Natural Res. and Infrastructure of the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of
Pat Choate, Director of Manufacturing Policy Project), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072408pctest1.pdf.
236
Avi Feller & Chuck Marr, Tax Rate for Richest 400 Taxpayers Plummeted in Recent Decades, Even as
Their Pre-tax Incomes Skyrocketed, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, Feb. 23, 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3090.
237
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., UPDATE 2010, available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10003.pdf.
238
See Feller & Marr, supra note 236, at 1.
239
Pagano, supra note 11, at 358. Fuel taxes vary among the states. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, NO. DOE/EIA 0380, PETROLEUM MARKETING MONTHLY, 153 tbl.EN1 (2010), available at
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_marketing_monthly/historical/201
0/2010_05/pdf/pmmall.pdf; WILLIAM J. MALLETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34567, PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION 4 (2008), available at
http://opencrs.com/document/RL34567/2008-07-09/ (follow “Open CRS (user submitted)” hyperlink).
240
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-780, HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: NEARLY ALL STATES
RECEIVED MORE FUNDING THAN THEY CONTRIBUTED IN HIGHWAY TAXES SINCE 2005 21 (2010), available
at www.gao.gov/new.items/d10780.pdf [hereinafter GAO HIGHWAY TRUST FUND REPORT, GAO-10-780].
241
KANSAS POLICYMAKER REPORT, supra note 21, at 2–11 (emphasis in original).
242
GAO Highway Trust Fund Report, GAO-10-780, supra note 240, at 21; see also U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, GAO-11-358T, Airport and Airway Trust Fund: Declining Balance Raises Concerns
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¶143

The obvious fix is to raise the gas tax. It costs little to collect, especially compared
to tolls, because it is collected at the point of sale and requires no special collection
equipment. The gas tax also fits with the currently popular user-pays philosophy.243
Unlike tolls, the fuel tax applies to every mile we drive, although greater use of hybrid
and electric cars are altering this connection.
¶144
However, the fuel tax suffers from the same problem that afflicts all taxes in the
United States these days: there are strong objections to paying taxes244 and, in particular
to raising taxes during a recession.245 These issues were discussed at the dawn of the
interstate highway system. “As Congress searched for an alternative financing plan in
1955, the highway-related interests that supported the Interstate System agreed on only
one thing—they did not want to pay for it. Why, they asked, should only users pay for a
highway network that would benefit the entire country?”246 We must, once more,
consider whether a gas tax is a fair allocation of financial burdens.247
¶145
In fact, we toll roads to raise revenues to build and maintain roads, but tolls also
create disincentives to using the road. Thus tolling can enhance mobility by reducing
congestion and the demand for roads when tolls vary according to congestion. Tolls that
create incentives for drivers to avoid driving alone in congested conditions may
encourage drivers to share rides, use public transportation, travel at less congested times,
or travel on less congested routes, if available.248
¶146
We need to take a frank look at our transportation reality. First, everyone benefits,
directly or indirectly, from our system of roads.249 We all—and drivers in particular—
collectively benefit from travel by people who never set tire on a road. Travel by
walking, mass transit, or telecommuting make our roads less crowded, slow damage to
the roadbed, and give us less polluted air and water. The Department of Transportation’s
recently released tools to promote sustainable highways supports this way of viewing our
infrastructure:

over Ability to Meet Future Demands (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11358t.pdf
(providing overview of the decline in air transportation funding).
243
The user-pays philosophy is that those who use a good should be the ones who pay for it. Examples of
user-pays funding in the case of highways are tolls and the fuel tax. See Tollroads: Their Past & Their
Future, TOLLROAD NEWS, http://www.tollroadsnews.com/background, for a discussion on user-pays. That
view is actually quite narrow and ignores the flow-on effects of tolls and the fuel tax. Although those
payments are made directly by individuals, the use of the infrastructure benefits the public broadly and the
cost of its use is spread through society, for example, by business tax deductions or by purchasing goods
that have been transported via the infrastructure.
244
See Josh Mitchell, Chamber of Commerce Pushes Increase in Gas Tax, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2009,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124769092956347439.html.
245
See id.
246
Weingroff, supra note 234, at 4.
247
TRANSP. REVIEW BD. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CRITICAL ISSUES IN TRANSPORTATION 2009 UPDATE 6
(2009), available at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/Onlinepubs/general/CriticalIssues09.pdf.
248
See KANSAS POLICYMAKER REPORT, supra note 21, at 3–5.
249
See AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: BENEFITS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007),
available at http://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/twenty_first_century.pdf;
see also ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASSETT, AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, HEALTHY RETURNS: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN SURFACE TRANSPORTATION (2005), available at
http://www.publictransportation.org/pdf/reports/healthy_returns.pdf.
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Viewing highways in isolation is not ideal when addressing sustainability.
Sustainability in highways should be addressed with the mindset that
highways are one part of transportation infrastructure, and transportation is
one aspect of meeting human needs.
In addition to addressing
environmental and natural resource needs, the development of sustainable
highways should include focus on access (not just mobility), moving
people and goods (not just vehicles), and providing people with
transportation choices, such as safe and comfortable routes for walking,
cycling, and transit.250
Meanwhile, our primary east-west and north-south roads I-80251 and I-81 have
become increasingly dangerous because of their heavy use.252 A November 2010 study of
Texas road conditions found that poor quality roads cost $22.6 billion a year “in the form
of traffic crashes, additional vehicle operating costs (VOC) and congestion-related
delays.” Poor road conditions cost Texas drivers “$5.3 billion annually—approximately
$343 per motorist,” and highway congestion in the San Antonio area costs the average
driver $765 a year.253 Providing methods for transporting goods that are more costeffective than trucks, such as rail or shipping on our national waterways,254 would ease
highway congestion, accidents, damage, and costs.
¶148
The Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009 recognizes the need to look
at transportation as an “intermodal” system, rather than “stove-piping” transportation
modes.255 The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure found: “Localized
congestion often has effects that ripple across the nation. The interconnected nature of
the network and the broad nationwide impacts of regionalized congestion require a
national response.”256 The Surface Transportation Authorization Act would, if passed,
re-establish and strengthen the Office of Intermodalism in order “to promote greater
efficiency and provide a renewed focus on delivering intermodal solutions to the nation’s
surface transportation problems” and to elevate “consideration of intermodal issues to the
highest levels within the Department by creating an Under Secretary of Transportation
for Intermodalism” with responsibility for the creation of a National Transportation
Strategic Plan.257 Intermodalism is not new. That this nation needs not just roads, but a

¶147

250

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., WHAT IS A SUSTAINABLE HIGHWAY?,
http://www.sustainablehighways.org/203/what-is-a-sustainable-highway.html; see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
A CBO STUDY: PUBLIC SPENDING ON TRANSPORTATION AND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 13 ( 2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11940/11-17-Infrastructure.pdf.
251
Keystone Shortway: Z. H. Confair Memorial Highway (April 9, 2010),
http://www.pahighways.com/interstates/I80.html.
252
Phillip Longman, Back on Tracks: A Nineteenth-century Technology Could be the Solution to our
Twenty-first-century Problems, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0901.longman.html.
253
TRIP, FUTURE MOBILITY IN TEXAS: MEETING THE STATE’S NEED FOR SAFE AND EFFICIENT MOBILITY 1,
11, 14–15, 16 (2010), http://www.tripnet.org/Texas_TRIP_Report_Nov_2010.pdf.
254
Phillip Longman, The Shipping News: Start Moving Freight by Water Again, and We’ll Use Less Oil,
Emit Less Carbon, Cut Highway Traffic—and Perhaps Even Save St. Louis, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug.,
2010, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.longman.html.
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STAA BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 10.
256
Id. at 2.
257
Id. at 11–13.
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transportation system, is an insight embodied in the very name chosen for our interstate
system: The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.258
In short, we are a people long overdue for a thoughtful discussion about taxes, taxing, and
their effects. Taxes are not just about money but about the meanings we attach to money.
We care about whether we get our money’s worth from the way tax dollars are spent, and
about the decisions that government makes. The natural progression of such a
discussion—if we can be honest and courageous—would begin from asking whether gas
taxes are reasonable259 to an exploration of who all benefits and who all pays and how
they pay, to whether taxes should be state or federal to the goals for setting appropriate
tax and transportation structures to meet our goals as a people.

258
259

Weingroff, supra note 234, at 4.
See, e.g., KAN. T-LINK , http://www.kansastlink.com/ (last visited Sep. 27, 2010).
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VI. APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS REFERRED TO IN THE ARTICLE
Excerpts from the Proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike Agreement
ARTICLE 1 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION
Section 1.1 Definitions. . . .
“Adverse Action” has the meaning ascribed thereto in Section 14.1(a).
“Change of Law” means (a) the adoption of any Law after the Bid Date, or (b) any change in any
Law or in the interpretation or application thereof by any Governmental Authority after the Bid
Date.
“Compensation Event” means (I) any applicable entry on the Turnpike by the Commonwealth
pursuant to Section 3.7(a)(v) through Section 3.7(a)(ix); provided that the Concessionaire’s use of
the Turnpike as a highway is materially impaired resulting in Losses or reduced Turnpike
Revenues, (ii) the Concessionaire’s compliance with or the implementation of a Required
Modification pursuant to Section 5.2, (iii) the Concessionaire’s compliance with or the
implementation of any modified or changed Operating Standard (as contemplated by Section
6.3(b)), (iv) the termination of an agreement with a Vendor as contemplated in Section 7.2(d), (v)
the occurrence of an Adverse Action as contemplated in Article 14, (vi) the circumstances
described in each of Section 2.5(I), Section 4.1(a), Section 4.2, Section 5.2 and Section 15.2(d),
(vii) any breach of the covenant set forth in Section 3.10(b) or (viii) the occurrence of a
Commonwealth Default as contemplated in Article 16.
“Concession Compensation” means, with respect to a Compensation Event, compensation
payable by the Commonwealth to the Concessionaire in order to restore the Concessionaire to the
same after-Tax economic position that the Concessionaire would have been in if such
Compensation Event had not occurred and calculated in accordance with Section 15.1(b).
“Material Adverse Effect” means a material adverse effect on the business, financial condition or
results of operations of the Turnpike taken as a whole or the rights of the Concessionaire under
this Agreement; provided, however, that no effect arising out of or in connection with or resulting
from any of the following shall be deemed, either alone or in combination, to constitute or
contribute to a Material Adverse Effect: (I) general economic conditions or changes therein; (ii)
financial, banking, currency or capital markets fluctuations or conditions (either in the United
States or any international market and including changes in interest rates); (iii) conditions
affecting any or all of the real estate, financial services, construction or toll road industries not
geographically limited to the Commonwealth; (iv) any existing event, occurrence or circumstance
of which the Concessionaire has actual knowledge as of the Bid Date; (v) any action, omission,
change, effect, circumstance or condition contemplated by this Agreement or attributable to the
execution, performance or announcement of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated
hereby, with the exception of litigation related to the execution or delivery of this Agreement or
related to the legislation referred to in Section 9.l(n); or (vi) any negligence, intentional
misconduct or bad faith of the Concessionaire or its Representatives.
Section 1.12 Laws. Unless specified otherwise, a reference to a Law is considered to be a
reference to (a) such Law as it may be amended, modified or supplemented from time to time, (b)
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all regulations and rules pertaining to or promulgated pursuant to such Law, (c) the successor to
the Law resulting from recodification or similar reorganizing of Laws and (d) all future Laws
pertaining to the same or similar subject matter. Nothing in this Agreement shall fetter or
otherwise interfere with the right and authority of the Commonwealth to enact, administer, apply
and enforce any Law. Except for Adverse Actions or if compensation or other relief is otherwise
available or provided for pursuant to applicable Law or this Agreement, the Concessionaire shall
not be entitled to claim or receive any compensation or other relief whatsoever as a result of the
enactment, administration, application or enforcement of any Law by the Commonwealth.
ARTICLE 3 TERMS OF THE LEASE
Section 3.7 . Rights of the Commonwealth to Access and Perform Work on the Turnpike.
(a) Reservation of Rights. The Commonwealth reserves (for itself and its Representatives, as well
as grantees, tenants, mortgagees, licensees and others claiming by, through or under the
Commonwealth) the right and shall, at all times during the Term, have the right to enter the
Turnpike and each and every part thereof at all reasonable times and upon reasonable prior notice
(except as provided in Section 3.7(a)(iii) and Section 3.7(a)(iv)), in the following circumstances:
(i) to inspect the Turnpike or determine whether or not the Concessionaire is in
compliance with its obligations under this Agreement or applicable Law pursuant to
Section 8.3. -9
(ii) if a Concessionaire Default then exists, to make any necessary repairs to the
Turnpike, perform any work therein and take any reasonable actions in connection
therewith, including remediation of Hazardous Substances, pursuant to Section 16.1
(b)(iii);
(iii) in the event of an actual or reported emergency, danger, threat, circumstance or event
that is reasonably believed by the Commonwealth or its designee (including relevant
police, fire, emergency services, armed forces, and any other security or emergency
personnel in accordance with Section 3.18) to have caused (or to present the imminent
potential to cause) injury to individuals, damage to property, or threat to the Environment
or to public safety, to take, at such times as the Commonwealth determines necessary in
its discretion and with notice to the Concessionaire if practicable under the
circumstances, such actions as the Commonwealth or such designee determines necessary
to respond to or to rectify such emergency, danger, threat, circumstance or event;
ARTICLE 14 ADVERSE ACTIONS
Section 14.1 Adverse Action.
(a) An “Adverse Action” shall occur if the Commonwealth or any Governmental
Authority established under the Laws of the Commonwealth, takes action at any time during the
Term (including enacting any legislation or ordinance or promulgating any rule or regulation) and
the effect of such action is reasonably expected (I) to be principally borne by the Concessionaire
or principally borne by private operators of toll roads in the Commonwealth; and (ii) to have a
material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest, except where such
action (A) is in response to any act or omission on the part of the Concessionaire or its
Representatives that (1) is illegal (other than an act or omission rendered illegal by virtue of the
Adverse Action), or (2) constitutes nonperformance by the Concessionaire, (B) is otherwise
permitted under this Agreement or (C) is mandated by action of the United States government (or
any agency thereof); provided, however, that none of the following shall constitute an Adverse
Action: (w) the exercise of police, subpoena or investigatory powers of the Commonwealth or
any Governmental Authority where the Commonwealth or Governmental Authority has
reasonable cause to exercise such powers or take other official action under existing Law; (x) an
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increase in Taxes not directed solely at the Concessionaire, the Turnpike, the users of the
Turnpike or private operators of toll roads in the Commonwealth or their users; (y) Taxes for
which the Concessionaire is not responsible pursuant to Section 3.10; and (2) the development,
redevelopment, construction, maintenance, modification or change in the operation of any
existing or new mode of transportation (including a road, street or highway) that results in the
reduction of Toll Revenues or in the number of vehicles using the Turnpike.
(b) If an Adverse Action occurs, the Concessionaire shall have the right to (I) be paid by
the Commonwealth the Concession Compensation with respect thereto (such Concession
Compensation, the “AA-Compensation”) or (ii) terminate this Agreement and be paid by the
Commonwealth the Turnpike Concession Value, in either case by giving notice in the manner
described in Section 14.1(c).
(c) Within 30 days following the date on which the Concessionaire first became aware of
the Adverse Action, the Concessionaire shall give notice (the “AA-Preliminary Notice”) to the
Commonwealth stating that an Adverse Action has occurred. Within 180 days following the date
of delivery of the AA-Preliminary Notice, the Concessionaire shall give the Commonwealth
another notice (the “AA-Notice”) setting forth (I) details of the effect of said occurrence that is
principally borne by the Concessionaire generally or principally by private operators of toll roads
in the Commonwealth and not by others, (ii) details of the material adverse effect of the said
occurrence on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest, (iii) a statement as to which
right referred to in Section 14.l(b) the Concessionaire elects to exercise, and (iv) if the
Concessionaire elects to exercise the right to Concession Compensation under Section 14.1(b),
the amount claimed as AA-Compensation and details of the calculation thereof. The
Commonwealth shall, after receipt of the AA-Notice, be entitled by notice to require the
Concessionaire to provide such further supporting particulars as the Commonwealth may
reasonably consider necessary. If the Commonwealth wishes to dispute the occurrence of an
Adverse Action or the amount of AA-Compensation, if any, claimed in the AA-Notice, the
Commonwealth shall give notice of dispute (the “AA-Dispute Notice”) to the Concessionaire
within 30 days following the date of receipt of the AA-Notice stating in reasonable detail the
grounds for such dispute. If neither the AA-Notice nor the AA-Dispute Notice has been
withdrawn within 30 days following the date of receipt of the AA-Dispute Notice by the
Concessionaire, the matter shall be submitted to the dispute resolution procedure in Article 19.
(d) If the Concessionaire has elected to exercise its right to AA-Compensation, the
Commonwealth shall pay the amount of Concession Compensation claimed by the
Concessionaire within 60 days following the date of receipt of the AA-Notice, or if a AA-Dispute
Notice has been given, then not later than 60 days following the date of determination of the AACompensation (together with interest at the rate set forth in Section 20.9 from the date of receipt
of the AA-Dispute Notice to the date on which payment is made); provided that, subject to the
right of the Concessionaire to receive interest at the rate set forth in Section 20.9 on the payment
owed by the Commonwealth from the date of receipt of the AA-Dispute Notice to the date on
which payment is made, the Commonwealth may defer any such payment for an additional 120
days if the Commonwealth determines, in its discretion, that such additional period is necessary
in order to obtain financing or otherwise to obtain the necessary funds to make such a payment.

Excerpts from the Chicago Parking Meter Contract.
Section 3.12. Competing Off-Street Parking.
(a) Subject to Section 3.12(b) and Section 3.12(e), the City will not operate, and will not permit
the operation of, a “Competing Public Parking Facility.” A “Competing Public Parking Facility”
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means any off-street public parking lot or public parking garage that (I) is (A) owned or operated
by the City or (B) operated by any Person and located on land owned by the City, or leased to the
City, (ii) is within one mile of a Concession Metered Parking Space, (iii) is used primarily for
general public parking; (iv) has a schedule of fees for parking motor vehicles that is less than
three times the highest Metered Parking Fees then in effect for Concession Metered Parking
Spaces in the same area; and (v) was not used for general public parking on the effective date of
this Agreement.
(b) As used in Section 3.12(a), the term “Competing Public Parking Facility” does not include (I)
any parking tot or parking garage located at, or providing parking for motor vehicles in
connection with the regular operations of public buildings and facilities including, but not limited
to, any airport, courthouse, correctional facility, police station, fire station, administrative
building, public school, public library, public park or recreational facility, public hospital or
similar government building; (ii) any parking facility located at, or within one-half mile of, any
sports stadium or sports arena having a seating capacity in excess of 15,000; (iii) park and ride
facilities that are used primarily by mass transit passengers; (iv) temporary parking facilities used
for Special Events; and (v) any parking facility that is used primarily to provide parking for an
affordable housing development or a public housing project.
(c) If the City undertakes or permits a Competing Public Parking Facility in violation of Section
3.12(a), such action shall constitute a Compensation Event requiring the payment of Concession
Compensation. Such action shall not constitute a City Default, an Adverse Action or a Reserved
Powers Adverse Action. No interest in real estate is conveyed by Section 3.12.
§14.3. Reserved Powers Adverse Actions.
(a) Use of Reserved Powers. The Parties acknowledge and agree that (I) it is anticipated
that the City will exercise its Reserved Powers during the Term, (ii) the impact of certain of such
actions may have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest;
(iii) the provisions of Article , including the provisions thereof relating to the payment of
Settlement Amounts by the City, are designed to compensate the Concessionaire for changes
resulting from the exercise by the City of its Reserved Powers in a manner that will maintain the
fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest over the Term and (iv)adverse changes may be
mitigated by other Reserved Power actions of the City that will have a favorable impact on the
fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest. The Parties also acknowledge and agree that
there may be circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Reserved Powers may have a
material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest that cannot be
compensated fully under the provisions of Article 7 and that under such “ circumstances the
Concessionaire may seek compensation with respect thereto (the “Reserved Powers Adverse
Action Compensation”).
(b) Reserved Powers Adverse Action. A “Reserved Powers Adverse Action” shall occur
if (I) the City takes any action or actions during the Term that would otherwise have constituted
an Adverse Action under Section 14.1 except that such action or actions were taken by the City
pursuant to its Reserved Powers, and (ii) such actions, individually or in the aggregate, are
reasonably expected (A) to be borne principally by the Concessionaire or other operators of onstreet metered parking systems and (B) to have a material adverse effect on the fair market value
of the Concessionaire Interest after taking into account the provisions of Article 7. In addition, the
events described in Section 7.10 relating to a reduction of Concession Metered Parking Spaces or
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to the average of the Monthly System in Service Percentage for certain Reporting Years being
less than eighty percent (80%) are each a Reserved Powers Adverse Action.
Excerpts from the Pocahontas Parkway—Richmond, Virginia Contract.
“Competitive Transportation Facilities” are defined as any State highway crossing the
James River within 3 miles of the project’s bridge crossing. The Department agrees that it shall
not, subject to certain exceptions, (I) initiate, authorize, franchise or finance private Competitive
Transportation Facilities; (ii) open any Department owned or operated Competitive
Transportation Facilities; and (iii) fail to exercise all discretionary authority available to it under
Laws, Regulations and Ordinances to prevent any other governmental or private entity from
developing Competitive Transportation Facilities, including but not limited to connections to
State Highways. (Section 12.1).
Association’s and the Trustee’s sole and exclusive remedy for a violation of this covenant shall
be to recoup an amount equal to the loss of Toll Revenues proximately caused by the
Department’s action as determined by the Toll Consultant (Section 17.9(b)).
Excerpts from the South Bay Expressway (SR 125) Agreement
Federal Highway Administration, Public Private Partnerships, PPP Agreements (South Bay Expressway
(SR 125) Agreement) Sept. 2005. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/PPP/agreements_sr125.htm

Developer has the right to seek compensation for “losses” in certain events and Caltrans agrees
and understands that Developer is entitled to seek compensation for losses resulting from the
occurrence of any of the following operative events:
(a) The State legislature, the California Transportation Commission, or any other
administrative agency or authority of the State enacts, adopts, promulgates, modifies,
repeals, or changes any State law, rule, initiative, referendum, constitutional provision, or
regulation, all or any of which has the effect of
(I) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility or portion
thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating the rights or benefits of
Developer under this Agreement, or
(iii) regulating or interfering with Developer’s right to establish and
collect tolls;
(b) The voters of the State, by initiative, referendum, or other ballot measure,
enact, adopt, promulgate, modify, repeal, or change any State law, rule, initiative,
referendum, constitutional provision, or regulation, all or any of which has the effect of
(I) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility or portion thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating the rights or benefits of
Developer under this Agreement, or
(iii) regulating or interfering with Developer’s right to establish and collect tolls;
or
(c) Any court issues any order, decree, or judgment which has the effect of
(I) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility or portion thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating, the rights or benefits of
Developer under this Agreement,
(iii) declaring illegal, void, or ultra vires any portion of this Agreement or
voiding the rights of Developer under this Agreement, or
(iv) regulating or interfering with Developer’s right to establish and
collect tolls.
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